Do Compensation Committee Members Perceive Changing CEO Incentive Performance Targets Mid-Cycle to be Fair?

Wilkins, Anne M.; Hermanson, Dana R.; Cohen, Jeffrey P.

doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2567-7

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…A second random selection technique (i.e., within each audit committee) was applied to identify one audit committee member per remaining company (to avoid sample bias resulting from multiple audit committee member participants from the same company where oversight activities would be expected to be the same). Then, we utilized various Internet websites such as fec.gov, zabasearch.com and whitepages.com to attempt to locate each potential participant's primary business or home address (Wilbanks et al, 2017; Wilkins et al, 2016).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How U.S. audit committees oversee internal control over financial reporting

2021

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On the basis of a survey of U.S. public company audit committee members, we provide detailed insights into the process underlying audit committee oversight of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), and we explore cross‐sectional variations in audit committee ICFR oversight. We find that audit committees spend the most time in the monitoring activities and control environment areas and the least time in the information and communication and control activities (related to revenue) areas. Further, our exploratory regression analysis reveals that audit committee member age and internal audit experience, company size and regulated industry are positively associated with the extent of overall audit committee ICFR oversight, whereas audit committee member certified public accountant (CPA) certification is negatively related to ICFR oversight. Finally, we provide many specific examples of ICFR oversight process elements that appear to be more substantive, extensive and proactive versus more ceremonial, limited and reactive.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How U.S. audit committees oversee internal control over financial reporting

2021

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“…There is only one experimental study in this paper's sample of qualitative research: Wilkins, Hermanson and Cohen (2015). In that study, the authors examined the conditions under which remuneration committees are likely to decrease a CEO's bonus target partway through the performance period.…”

Section: Remuneration Practicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive remuneration principles, practices and processes: an institutional logics perspective

Crombie

2015

IJCG

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Agency Logic assumes that executives are greedy and opportunistic, which implies that monetary incentives are necessary to ensure they act in the best interests of shareholders; whereas Corporate Logic assumes that executives are trustworthy professionals, which implies that they will act in the best interests of shareholders irrespective of the use of monetary incentives. Prior qualitative research on executive remuneration is reviewed in this paper in order to ascertain how these Logics influence the decision-making of remuneration committees. Given that Agency Logic and Corporate Logic are opposites, there is a tension between the remuneration principles of pay-for-performance and competitive pay. However, Corporate Logic trumps Agency Logic as remuneration committees prioritise competitive pay ahead of other principles, so that talented executives will be retained. The paper also Executive Remuneration Principles, Practices and ProcessesPage 2 discusses a range of other remuneration principles and practices as well as the remuneration processes that have diffused both Logics amongst remuneration committees.

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