Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games

Gao, Jia; Li, Zhi; Wu, Te; Wang, Long

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.04.018

Cited by 51 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…To escape hatch out of the evolutionary stalemate, several mechanisms have been proposed, such as costly punishment [22,23,24,25,26], voluntary participation [27,10,11] and social diversity [12,28,29]. In ref.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Wang

Chen

Gao

et al. 2013

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption that participation is either compulsive or unidirectional optional in collective interactions. Nevertheless, how the mutual selection rule, a more realistic participation mode, affects the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is still unclear. Here we introduce a reputation-based mutual selection rule for constituting participant groups into spatial threshold public goods games, where the public goods game can be conducted only if the participant number is not less than the threshold parameter. Interestingly, we find that moderate tolerance range results in the best environment for cooperators' viability. Also, we show that lower member threshold is favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and correspondingly provide some typical snapshots for defectors, "active" cooperators (cooperators on which the public goods games are successfully conducted), and "inactive" cooperators. Moreover, we investigate the effects of memory factor in individuals' reputation updating on the evolution of cooperation. Our work may provide an appropriate and alternative perspective in understanding the widespread cooperative behaviors in some realistic situations.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Wang

Chen

Gao

et al. 2013

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

Self Cite

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“…In this direction, one of the first steps has been the introduction of a structure in the population to take into account the complex interaction patterns present in real societies [21][22][23]. Simultaneously, other efforts have been put in mimicing realistic traits of our societies like reputation [24], reward [25,26] and punishment mechanisms [27][28][29][30][31], human mobility [32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39] and different types of social heterogeneity [40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51]. Heterogeneity seems to play a fundamental role in cooperative behavior -although some results question the role of network heterogeneity [52,53]-, and several works have dealt with the effects of allowing an uneven distribution of players' resources [47][48][49][50][51] Results show that there is an increase in the levels of cooperation for highly heterogenous resource allocation (positive values of α, see legend).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

2017

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Public goods games (PGGs) represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution—known as Pareto Law—and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of PGGs that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional PGGs, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the pay-offs naturally emerges but also that if players do not invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators. Our results not only give an explanation for wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also point to a conceptual change on cooperation in collective dilemmas.

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“…The emergence of cooperation in sizable groups between unrelated individuals puzzles diverse fields of social sciences [10]. Many mechanisms have been proposed to elucidate the prosperity of cooperative behaviours under the exploitation of defectors in PGG, such as voluntary [11], punishment [12][13][14], social diversity [15], heterogeneous wealth distribution [16], diverse contribution [17], Matthew effect [18], coevolution [19][20][21] and interdependent networks [22][23][24]. However, it is known that human altruism goes far beyond what has been observed in the animal world [25].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Pei

Wang²,

2017

New J. Phys.

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Income redistribution is the transfer of income from some individuals to others directly or indirectly by means of social mechanisms, such as taxation, public services and so on. Employing a spatial public goods game, we study the influence of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation. Two kinds of evolutionary models are constructed, which describe local and global redistribution of income respectively. In the local model, players have to pay part of their income after each PGG and the accumulated income is redistributed to the members. While in the global model, all the players pay part of their income after engaging in all the local PGGs, which are centred on himself and his nearest neighbours, and the accumulated income is redistributed to the whole population. We show that the cooperation prospers significantly with increasing income expenditure proportion in the local redistribution of income, while in the global model the situation is opposite. Furthermore, the cooperation drops dramatically from the maximum curvature point of income expenditure proportion. In particular, the intermediate critical points are closely related to the renormalized enhancement factors.

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Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games

Cited by 51 publications

References 24 publications

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

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