Distributional risk in PES: Exploring the concept in the Payment for Environmental Forest Services program, Vietnam

Vietnam’s forest cover changes 2005–2016: Veering from transition to (yet more) transaction?

“…Nonetheless, several findings of our study echo critical voices (e.g. McElwee et al 2019, To & Dressler 2019, Duong & de Groot 2018, Tran et al 2016 who noted that PFES funds were often controlled or seized by powerful stakeholders, were sometimes misappropriated, and were rarely used efficiently to achieve stated policy goals. Clearly, PFES policies are in tune with a territorial organization of 'forestlands' that primarily follows rationales of national economic development, and where other concerns are subordinate (cf.…”

Payments for ecosystem services programs: A global review of contributions towards sustainability

“…Their contracts are signed between governments and households, communities, or social organizations (C8, C10, II→C5, C6: + ). Payments are not come directly from providers, but from provincial intermediaries and then to the local [ [266] , [267] , [268] ]. Notably, payments in many provinces here are still too low 7 [ 159 , 259 ], reducing the incentive to protect and develop forests [ 269 ] (C9, C10, II→C3, III: −).…”

Success Factors of National-Scale Forest Restorations in South Korea, Vietnam, and China

“…It should be noted that reward (cash and in-kind payments) and voluntarism are both important factors, as they help participants understand the benefits and consequences when they fulfil and/or fail to comply with agreed rules [66]. A recent study for Vietnam case shows, however, the a payment system can be susceptible to distributional risk, resulting in the rich getting most [67]. This illustrates the highly organized institutional complexity of the inspection and monitoring system that is required for the efficient implementation of programs [68].…”