Distributed source-relay selection scheme for vehicular relaying networks under eavesdropping attacks

Abstract

The recent development of vehicular networking technologies brings the promise of improved driving safety and traffic efficiency. Cooperative communication is recognized as a low-complexity solution for enhancing both the reliability and the throughput of vehicular networks. However, due to the openness of wireless medium, the vehicular wireless communications (VWC) is also vulnerable to potential eavesdropping attacks. To tackle with this issue, we in this paper propose a novel user-cooperation scheme with anti-eavesdropping capabilities. Specifically, prior to any frame transmission, a source-relay pair is jointly selected to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. After that, the selected relay assists the source to deliver its data to the destination. The proposed selection scheme can be realized in a fully distributed manner, and the security is guaranteed without using any encryption techniques at the upper layers. The closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability and the intercept probability are derived, and the achievable diversity order is also analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the competing counterparts in terms of both the secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy rate.

Performance evaluation of amplify‐and‐forward relaying cooperative vehicular networks under physical layer security

“…, 35(eq. 2.16.8.5) we can obtain  1 ( ) as in (30). Likewise, following the similar steps as used to evaluate (30), we can readily obtain  2 ( ),  3 ( ), and  4 ( ).…”

“…and the terms w k1 ( ), w k1,M ( ),w k1,M ( ), v k1,M ( ),v k1,M ( ), and q k1 ( ) are given in Table 2. Moreover,  2 ( ) can be obtained and represented by replacing the subscript "k1" of w k1 ( ), w k1,M ( ), w k1,M ( ) with "k", and v k1,M ( ) by w k,k1,M ( ), v k1,M ( ) by w k,k1,M ( ), and q k1 ( ) by w k,k1 ( ) in (30)…”

“…However, a little attention has been devoted to take PHY‐security aspects into account in analyzing the performance of vehicular networks. Sun et al have analyzed the secrecy performance for the AF‐based V2I networks with a fixed eavesdropper terminal under Rayleigh channels. Zhang and Pan have evaluated the secrecy performance for a DF‐based V2V network over double‐Rayleigh fading channels.…”

“…Zhang and Pan have evaluated the secrecy performance for a DF‐based V2V network over double‐Rayleigh fading channels. However, in the aforementioned works, the authors did not exploit the direct links between the source and destination and between the source and the eavesdropper. Therefore, to the best of authors' knowledge, the PHY‐security for cooperative vehicular networks by using AF protocol at the relay terminal and exploiting the direct links between the source and destination terminals and between the source and eavesdropper terminals has not been investigated in the open literature.…”

Vehicle Secrecy Parameters for V2V Communications

“…In V2V communication, secrecy capacity can be improved by adoption at one relay R between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B. In a general, secrecy capacity of a cooperative relay communication is higher than that of the direct communication without a relay [25][26][27][28]. For simplicity of the analysis of secrecy capacity, we assume that the system model comprises one relay R between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, as shown in Figure 4.…”