Disclosure of endogenous information

Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir

doi:10.1007/s40505-016-0099-7

Cited by 45 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…16 Relatedly, the reader may wonder whether the main results of the paper would change if the message m generated by the mechanism φ was privately observed by the sender. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014b) show that the optimal mechanism does not change and m is fully disclosed by the sender if m is verifiable.…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Experimental design to persuade

Kolotilin

2015

Games and Economic Behavior

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A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender optimally discloses only whether the receiver's utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sender's and receiver's welfare to be monotonic in information. In particular, the sender's welfare increases with the precision of the sender's information and decreases with the precision of public information.

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Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Experimental design to persuade

Kolotilin

2015

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Our article is related to the extensive literature on persuasion (e.g., Jovanovic, ; Milgrom and Roberts, ; Glazer and Rubinstein, , , ). As ours, some papers combine information acquisition with persuasion (e.g., Celik, ; Brocas and Carillo, ; Henry, ; Kamenica and Gentzkow, ; Gentzkow and Kamenica, , ; Felgenhauer and Schulte, )…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 86%

“…They show that KG's concavication approach extends to settings where the costs of a signal are proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. Gentzkow and Kamenica () study competition between several senders who try to persuade a receiver.…”

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confidence: 99%

Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation

Felgenhauer

Loerke²

2017

Int Economic Review

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This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the sender's stakes. * Manuscript . 2 Once a regression method is described and the database is public, manipulation is not possible. We make a similar case for logical arguments in footnote 3. Such arguments have persuasive power, and, hence, they can be viewed as decision relevant. Naturally, they are also imperfect.3 Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) interpret, e.g., logical arguments as decision relevant hard information that result from experimentation: If the assumptions underlying a logical argument are revealed, then they cannot be manipulated. The deductions are logical and logic cannot be manipulated. Logical arguments have persuasive power; therefore, they can be viewed as signals about a decision relevant state of the world. The signals are imperfect, as the underlying assumptions do not cover every real world aspect. A thought experiment (i.e., drawing a set of assumptions and making a deduction) yields a signal. For such arguments the assumption that they are acquired in private by running a series of thought experiments and selectively revealed for persuasion is natural. 829 C (2017) by the

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“…As KG show, this model is isomorphic to a model in which a sender can commit to a disclosure rule before becoming privately informed -i.e., commit to how her knowledge will map to her advice. It is also equivalent to models in which a sender is required to certifiably disclosed her knowledge while being free to choose what she actually learns (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2014b). …”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, any two experiments that induce the same marginal distribution over the sender's posterior must necessarily induce the same marginal distribution over the receiver's posteriors. 15 In fact, (6) implies that the set of joint distributions of players posterior beliefs under common priors and heterogeneous priors form a bijection. That is, belief disagreement does not generate "more ways" to persuade the receiver.…”

Section: Induced Distributions Of Posterior Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

Alonso

Câmara

2016

Journal of Economic Theory

119

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In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment (public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sufficient conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main condition is that the receiver's action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random variable.JEL classification: D72, D83, M31.

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Disclosure of endogenous information

Cited by 45 publications

References 17 publications

Experimental design to persuade

Experimental design to persuade

Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

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