An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information. negative|peach) = Pr(positive|lemon) = 1 − p. The employer is positive (negative) if the interview signal is positive (negative). Finally, the employer makes a hiring decision.I restrict attention to grading policies that generate three possible grades, A, B, or C, that convince both the positive and negative, only the positive, or no employer to hire. This is without loss of generality because convincing the negative employer also convinces the positive employer.The school chooses to maximize the probability of hire, 1 · Pr (A) + Pr (positive|B) · Pr (B) + 0 · Pr (C) subject to the constraint imposed by the prior distribution of the student's ability, m Pr (peach|m) · Pr (m) = Pr(peach) = 0 2Under the optimal grading policy, grades A and B barely persuade the negative and positive employers to hire, whereas grade C makes the employer certain that the student is a lemon; so, after some algebra, Pr (peach|A) = p, Pr (peach|B) = 1 − p, and Pr (peach|C) = 0. Using these conditions, it is easy to show that Pr (positive|B) = 2p(1 − p). The school's problem is thus a linear program: to maximize the utility function Pr(A) + 2p(1 − p) Pr(B) over probabilities Pr(A), Pr(B), and Pr(C), subject to the Bayesian budget constraint p Pr(A) + (1 − p) Pr(B) = 0 23 The Bayesian persuasion problem of this paper is mathematically similar to the delegation problem initiated by Holmström (1984). Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amador and Bagwell (2013) characterize necessary and sufficient conditions under which interval delegation is optimal. Their conditions resemble my conditions under which interval revelation is optimal, but their proofs are more involved.