Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons

Abstract

This paper comments on the history of the search for better election procedures, then discusses dimensions relevant to the evaluation and comparison of competing procedures. Its aim is to indicate the variety of factors involved in the search and to suggest an integrative perspective that could aid further research.The dimensions examined include the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and methods of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and f'maneing, and institutional effects. Theory and Decision 15 (1983) 371

Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

“…Drawing on Fishburn (1983), they name five areas that have received considerable attention (electoral formulas, ballot structure, district magnitude, size of legislature, and number of candidates/parties) and no less than 13 areas that deserve more attention (suffrage and registration requirements, ease of voter access to electoral process, ease of party/candidate access to political process, structure of political competition, special features of ballot format, special features for transforming votes into outcomes, districting procedures, campaign financing rules, campaign timing rules, other features of campaigning, number and types of offices subject to electoral choice, degree of "bundling" elections, and mechanisms for voter intervention).…”

Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)

“…There are numerous dimensions studied in the search for better election procedures, including the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and methods of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and financing, and institutional effects. In paper (Fishburn, 1983), Fishburn comments on the history of the search for better election procedures and discusses dimensions such as those above that are relevant to the evaluation and comparison of competing procedures. In paper (Fishburn & Gehrlein, 1982), Fishburn and Gehrlein discuss the propensities of different voting procedures to elect the simple majority candidate when one exists in a multicandidate election.…”