Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

Voigt, Stefan

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9638-1

Cited by 126 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 183 publications

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“…Anticipating this process in the spending committees, the agenda setter in the budget committee will propose a lean government, such that a lack of legislative cohesion leads to special-interest policy-making combined with a relatively small budget (Voigt 2011). The capacity to redistribute in the sense of large-scale general income-transfer schemes is thus reduced in presidential regimes.…”

Section: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies

Feld

Schnellenbach

2013

Public Choice

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We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. JEL-Classification: D31, H22, H11, H50, I38, P50.

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Section: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies

Feld

Schnellenbach

2013

Public Choice

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“…This result contributes to the literature studying the effects of fiscal rules by showing that the effect of constitutional-level rules is robust and economically relevant. This analysis also contributes to the large literature on the economic effects of constitutions (e.g., Mueller 2003) and particularly to its more recent empirical or positive side (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003;Voigt 2011) by presenting evidence of direct policy-effects from constitutional provisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions

2016

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes:Evidence from Historical ConstitutionsAbstract This paper studies the long-run fiscal consequences of balanced budget rules (BBR) that are enshrined in a country's constitution. Using historical data dating back to the 19th century and applying a difference-in-difference approach we find that the introduction of a constitutional-BBR reduces government debt-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios, on average, by around 11 and 3 percentage points, respectively. We do not find evidence that BBRs affect tax revenues. Our analysis indicates that such rules reduce the probability of experiencing a debt crisis and that the effective enforcement of BBRs can be conditional on the quality of democratic institutions. In addition, we implement an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on changing the constitution. This and other tests suggest that the relations we find are largely causal going from BBRs to fiscal outcomes.

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“…The analyses often focus on specific political institutions (see, e.g., Feld & Voigt 2003, Persson & Tabellini 2004, Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya 2007, Blume et al 2009, Voigt 2011. In contrast, we apply a classification of political systems based on the implied dispersion of political power, thus encompassing a broad range of institutions.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Political Selection and the Concentration of Political Power

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may February 2014Abstract This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities and are driven by office rents as well as welfare considerations. We show that variations in power concentration involve a trade-off. On the one hand, higher concentration of power enables the voters' preferred politician to enforce larger parts of his agenda. On the other hand, higher power concentration increases electoral stakes and thereby induces stronger policy distortions. We identify a negative relation between the optimal level of power concentration and the extent of office motivation. In particular, full concentration of power is desirable if and only if politicians are mostly welfareoriented. The results of an empirical analysis are in line with this prediction.

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Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

Abstract: Abstract:Analysis of the economic effects of constitutional rules has made substantial progress over the last decade. This survey provides an overview of this rapidly growing research area and also discusses a number of methodological issues and identifies underresearched areas.

Cited by 126 publications

References 183 publications

Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies

Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies

Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions

Political Selection and the Concentration of Political Power

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