Different paths to economic reform in Russia and China: causes and consequences

Buck, Trevor; Filatotchev, Igor; Nolan, Peter; Wright, Mike

doi:10.1016/s1090-9516(00)00044-4

Cited by 96 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Finally, we compare two stylized cases of employee or insider control in post-privatization Russia (Buck et al 2000) and in Japan (Aoki 1988) to explore the effectiveness of employee participation as a corporate governance practice. In particular, our stylized examples concern large automobile companies that are integral to the economic development of these two countries.…”

Section: Case 3: Insider Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Insider control emerged in the Russian firm as a result of mass privatization, which has been designed to transfer state ownership to private investors and promote the development of Anglo-Saxon governance based on active capital markets. Instead, it resulted in employees and managers receiving large ownership stakes that guarantee absolute insider control, with outside minority investors being effectively excluded from participation in strategy decisions (Buck et al 2000). Employee share ownership is also very common in Japan, although the size of stakes is smaller.…”

Section: Case 3: Insider Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities

Aguilera

Filatotchev

Gospel

et al. 2008

Organization Science

Self Cite

621

215

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.  We would like to thank the UK Department for Trade and Industry with support for the research on which this study was based. The authors would like to thank the participants of seminars and workshops at Cass Business School, University of Groningen, University of Auckland, UK AIB Chapter (King's College London), Copenhagen Business School, the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally to this paper. Permanent repository link AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COSTS, CONTINGENCIES, AND COMPLEMENTARITIES ABSTRACTThis paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices. In contrast to such 'closed systems' approaches, we propose a framework based on 'open systems' approaches to organizations which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies, and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore how costs, contingencies, and complementarities impact effectiveness of different governance aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different approaches to policy such as 'soft-law' or 'hard law'.

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Section: Case 3: Insider Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Case 3: Insider Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities

Aguilera

Filatotchev

Gospel

et al. 2008

Organization Science

Self Cite

621

215

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…В реальности инвесторы были готовы вкладывать капитал в ОЭЗ только в том случае, если считали их более привлекательными по сравнению с други-ми регионами страны. «Кажется, что правительства, желающие привлечь прямые иностранные инвести-ции, должны сосредоточиться на снижении рисков в государстве, сделав это первоочередной полити-ческой задачей, поскольку международные рынки капитала позволяют инвесторам вкладывать сред-ства только тогда, когда соотношение ожидаемого результата и рисков воспринимается как привлека-тельное» [Buck et al, 2000].…”

Section: цель и управлениеunclassified

Technology-Innovative Special Economic Zones in Russia: Lessons from China

Kaartemo¹,

Liuhto²

2010

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В России особые экономические зоны (ОЭЗ) не обладают необходи мыми преимуществами для привлечения иностранных инвесторов. Для того, чтобы привлечь инвестиции, необходимо мобилизовать расходы на исследования и разработки в частном секторе, кото рый станет драйвером реформирования россий ской сырьевой эко номики. Однако такая инновационная реформа неосуществима без участия крупных мировых корпораций, а процесс ее реализации может растянуться на десятилетия. Трансформация экономики Китая является примером того, как ОЭЗ могут повлиять на вектор национального развития. Насколько этот опыт применим для модернизации России? Технологические инновации в особых экономических зонах России

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“…There are many similarities between Russia and China as economies in transition (Buck et al, 2000). These include the enormous geographical scale, abundance of cheap labor, and large potential markets to attract foreigners.…”

Section: Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A strong and committed leadership can also push economic reforms against the interests of some interest groups. For example, Buck et al (2000) describe that the Chinese Communist Party stimulated joint ventures with foreign partners against possible dissent of insiders of state enterprises excluded from the deals. The central authorities stimulated foreign investors to select from the state enterprises the best physical and human assets to form joint enterprises, usually geographically separated from the unreformed parts of the state enterprise left behind.…”

Section: Political Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%