An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities

Abstract

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.  We would like to thank the UK Department for Trade and Industry with support for the research on which this study was based. The authors would like to thank the participants of seminars and workshops at Cass Business School, University of Groningen, University of Auckland, UK AIB Chapter (King's College London), Copenhagen Business School, the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally to this paper. Permanent repository link AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COSTS, CONTINGENCIES, AND COMPLEMENTARITIES ABSTRACTThis paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices. In contrast to such 'closed systems' approaches, we propose a framework based on 'open systems' approaches to organizations which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies, and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore how costs, contingencies, and complementarities impact effectiveness of different governance aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different approaches to policy such as 'soft-law' or 'hard law'.

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

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Pressões internas e externas na utilização de padrões de divulgação de informações socioambientais amplamente aceitos: uma análise sobre estrutura de governança corporativa, ambiente institucional e a perspectiva de legitimação

“…Para Aguilera et al (2008), a relação entre governança corporativa e CSR pode ser analisada pelo efeito causado pelas ações dos gestores corporativos que fazem parte da estrutura formal organizacional e participam do processo de tomada de decisão.…”

“…As ações e decisões desses gestores permeiam a estrutura formal de governança representada pelo conjunto de mecanismos e práticas que objetivam garantir que eles ajam de maneira a proteger, gerar e distribuir a riqueza investida na organização por e para os acionistas e stakeholders (AGUILERA et al, 2008;NAKAJIMA, 2014).…”

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