Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

Brock, Jonathan; Lange, Andreas; Özbay, Erkut Y.

doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.415

Cited by 199 publications

(194 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

155

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Intuitively, social preferences as well as individual risk preferences will affect giving in the face of risk. While there is an extensive literature on the role of social preferences under certainty (Camerer 2003;Engel 2011) and a smaller, growing, literature on ex-post and ex-ante perspectives on fairness under risk (e.g., Brock et al 2013;Cappelen et al 2013), to date the role of risk preferences remains unstudied. In this paper we present, to the best of our knowledge, first evidence on how own risk preferences and perceived risk preferences of others affect generosity in situations where risk cannot be resolved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries' final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals' risk preferences are predictive for giving inThe research documented in this paper was partly financed by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (project number 11429) and also received financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (project number 400-09-451). Uncertain (2017) 55:95-118 both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple nonlinear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries' side but less so when risk is on the givers' side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences. Electronic supplementary material

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…56 Other recent experimental studies underpin the view that it is often more rational if external third parties make decisions 52 when uncertainty or risk is involved. 57 In this context, further empirical and experimental studies should be conducted, especially on the question whether a group of jurors is able to show enough empathy to effectively nudge the decision of consumers in a desired direction while preserving the latters' freedom of choice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet’s Jury Theorem as a Rational Justification of Soft Paternalistic Consumer Policies

Dold

2016

Nudging - Possibilities, Limitations and Applications in European Law and Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe objective of this note is to revisit the meaningfulness of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and apply it to the recent debate on liberal paternalism and consumer protection. The CJT consists of two parts, (a) stating that a jury of experts is always more competent than a single expert given a certain level of competence, and (b) asserting that for large juries, the collective competence approaches infallibility. This note argues that these insights suggest the application of a Condorcet jury voting procedure to the case of nudging boundedly rational consumers. The note proposes a simple calculus for finding an optimal jury size and advocates consumers' metapreferences as the jury's evaluative dimension for designing soft paternalistic policies. JEL Classification: B41, D03, D63, D71

show abstract

“…The closest analogue is the paper by Brock, Lange et al (2013). Similar to us they use a normal dictator game with fixed endowments as a baseline.…”

Section: Figure 1 Dictator Generosity As a Function Of Recipient Desementioning

confidence: 99%

If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient's Endowments are Risky

Engel

Goerg

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL: C91, D03, D81

show abstract

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

Cited by 199 publications

References 26 publications

Giving in the face of risk

Giving in the face of risk

Condorcet’s Jury Theorem as a Rational Justification of Soft Paternalistic Consumer Policies

If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient's Endowments are Risky

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About