This is a reply to “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment” by Brunner, Camerer, and Goeree which corrects some computational errors in Selten and Chmura (2008) and extends the comparison of five stationary concepts to data from previous experimental studies. We critically discuss their new findings and relate them to the data of Selten and Chmura (2008). We conclude that the parametric concepts of action-sampling equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium perform better than quantal response equilibrium, and that the non-parametric concept of impulse-balance equilibrium performs at least as well as quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C70)

In statistics, two-sample tests are used to determine whether two samples have been drawn from the same population. An example of such a test is the widely used Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test. There are other distributionfree tests that might be applied in similar occasions. In this article, we describe a two-sample omnibus test introduced by Epps and Singleton, which usually has a greater power than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test although it is distribution free. The superiority of the Epps-Singleton characteristic function test is illustrated in two examples. We compare the two tests and supplement this contribution with a Stata implementation of the omnibus test.

Although cooperation and trust are essential features for the development of prosperous populations, they also put cooperating individuals at risk for exploitation and abuse. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that the solution to the problem resides in the practice of mimicry and imitation, the expectation of opponent's mimicry and the reliance on similarity indices. Here we fuse the principles of enacted and expected mimicry and condition their application on two similarity indices to produce a model of mimicry and relative similarity. Testing the model in computer simulations of behavioral niches, populated with agents that enact various strategies and learning algorithms, shows how mimicry and relative similarity outperforms all the opponent strategies it was tested against, pushes noncooperative opponents toward extinction, and promotes the development of cooperative populations. The proposed model sheds light on the evolution of cooperation and provides a blueprint for intentional induction of cooperation within and among populations. It is suggested that reducing conflict intensities among human populations necessitates (i) instigation of social initiatives that increase the perception of similarity among opponents and (ii) efficient lowering of the similarity threshold of the interaction, the minimal level of similarity that makes cooperation advisable.conflict resolution | prisoner's dilemma | SERS | TFT | WSLS

In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: action-sampling learning and impulse-matching learning. These two models, together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning, are applied to 12 different 2 × 2 games and their results are compared with the results from experimental data. We test whether the models are capable of replicating the aggregate distribution of behavior, as well as correctly predicting individuals' round-by-round behavior. Our results are two-fold: while the simulations with impulse-matching and action-sampling learning successfully replicate the experimental data on the aggregate level, individual behavior is best described by self-tuning EWA. Nevertheless, impulse-matching learning has the second-highest score for the individual data. In addition, only self-tuning EWA and impulse-matching learning lead to better round-by-round predictions than the aggregate frequencies, which means they adjust their predictions correctly over time.

In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the interplay between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a benchmark, in some treatments workers are paid a bonus conditional on reaching a pre-specified goal. We observe that the use of personal work goals leads to a significant output increase. This is found if goals are self-chosen by the workers, as well as if goals are set exogenously by the principal -although in the latter case, the exact size of the goal plays a crucial role. Strikingly, the positive effect of self-chosen goals persists even if the goal is not backed up by monetary incentives. Our results suggest that work contracts where -through the choice of a personal work goal -workers themselves determine the risk and the size of their bonus payment at the same time can be a powerful incentive device.JEL classification: A12, C93, D01, D03, D24, J24, J33, M52

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThe importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially increase productivity by facilitating coordination, and that the effect strongly interacts with the exact shape of the production function. Taken together, our data highlight the relevance of the production function for organization construction and suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams. (98 words) JEL classification: C92, D23, D63, J31, J33, J41, M12, M52.

Following the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the globe coerced their citizens to adhere to preventive health behaviours, aiming to reduce the effective reproduction numbers of the virus. Driven by game theoretic considerations and inspired by the work of US National Research Council's Committee on Food Habits (1943) during WWII, and the post-WWII Yale Communication Research Program, the present research shows how to achieve enhanced adherence to health regulations without coercion. To this aim, we combine three elements: (i) indirect measurements, (ii) personalized interventions, and (iii) attitude changing treatments (IMPACT). We find that a cluster of short interventions, such as elaboration on possible consequences, induction of cognitive dissonance, addressing next of kin and similar others and receiving advice following severity judgements, improves individuals' health-preserving attitudes. We propose extending the use of IMPACT under closure periods and during the resumption of social and economic activities under COVID-19 pandemic, since efficient and lasting adherence should rely on personal attitudes rather than on coercion alone. Finally, we point to the opportunity of international cooperation generated by the pandemic.

Agents’ decisions to exert effort depend on the incentives and the potential costs involved. So far, most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our laboratory experiments underline that both the incentive and the cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort slider task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers’ performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a nontrivial manner. In general, performance decreases as implicit costs increase. Yet the magnitude of the reaction differs across incentive schemes and across the offered outside options, which, in turn, alters estimated output elasticities. In addition, comparisons between incentive schemes crucially depend on the implicit costs. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.