We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

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We test the value of unconditional non-monetary gifts as a way to improve health worker performance in a low income country health setting. We randomly assigned health workers to different gift treatments within a program that visited health workers, measured performance and encouraged them to provide high quality care for their patients. We show that unconditional non-monetary gifts improve performance by 20 percent over a six-week period, compared to the control group. We compare the impact of the unconditional gift to one in which a gift is offered conditional on meeting a performance target and show that only the unconditional gift results in a statistically significant improvement. This demonstrates that organizations can improve the performance of health workers in the medium term without using financial incentives.

The previous article (‘Interactive education in public administration (1): The role of teaching “objects”’) described the benefits of ‘moving from behind the lectern’ to engage in interactive teaching in public policy and administration, and the central role of ‘objects’ in that process. But teaching ‘objects’ can only produce effective results if they are used in a way that achieves learning objectives. Interaction for interaction’s sake is not enough; it must also lead to understanding of new concepts and analytical approaches. Moreover, interactive teaching can be challenging for teachers who mainly use didactic traditional lecturing, since it entails sharing control of the discussion with students. This article explains and justifies a purposeful, structured framework both for stimulating engagement in public administration courses, and for turning that engagement into learning, in a way that provides for the intellectual safety of the teacher and student – which is crucial for enabling participants to take risks in classroom discussions. In the process, the article further addresses the rationale for using interactive and object-based approaches specifically in public administration and related disciplines.

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