Deregulation of Shopping Hours: The Impact on Independent Retailers and Chain Stores

Abstract

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Rhythm of urban retail landscapes: Shopping hours and the urban chronotopes

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Shopping Hours and Price Competition with Loyal Consumers

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“…Early empirical studies show that shopping hours deregulation can lead to a redistribution of market sales from small to large stores (Morrison and Newman, 1983), and increase the prices charged by large stores (Tanguay et al, 1995). On the theoretical side, recent studies (Inderst and Irmen, 2005;Shy and Stenbacka, 2008;Wenzel, 2011;Flores, 2015) find that prices are the same when retailers are open (and closed) for the same time period (symmetric opening hours) and prices can increase when one retailer opens longer hours than its rival (asymmetric opening hours). 1 Existing papers typically assume that the total market demand is invariant to the level of shopping hours.…”

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