Depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts of global warming

Hoel, Michael; Kverndokk, Snorre

doi:10.1016/0928-7655(96)00005-x

Cited by 364 publications

(209 citation statements)

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“…Another justification for using a ceiling is that most operational climate change models have used ceilings to examine the economic effects of global warming (e.g., see Zhang and Folmer, 1998). backstop resource. 4 Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and Tahvonen (1997) analyze the path of optimal carbon taxes in a model with a nonrenewable resource and a clean backstop. Using stockdependent extraction costs, they show that there may be a period of simultaneous extraction of the nonrenewable and renewable resource.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Hotelling Model with a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution

2004

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Environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol aim to stabilize the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, which is mainly caused by the burning of nonrenewable resources such as coal.We characterize the solution to the textbook Hotelling model when there is a ceiling on the stock of emissions. We consider both increasing and decreasing demand for energy. We show that when the ceiling is binding, both the low-cost nonrenewable resource and the high-cost renewable resource may be used jointly. A key implication is that if energy demand were to decline in the long run, we may supplement energy supply through ''clean'' renewables to meet the environmental standard, but then revert back to using only ''dirty'' fossil fuels in the future when the ceiling has become non-binding. That is, the much heralded societal ''transition'' to clean energy resources may be somewhat short-lived.JEL classification : Q12, Q32, Q41

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confidence: 99%

A Hotelling Model with a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution

2004

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“…Consequently, short term emissions will increase, while the cumulative level will remain unchanged, all else equal. Climate change mitigation policies should to the contrary aim at reducing the discounted value of profits for resource owners in the short term, thereby inducing them to postpone extraction (Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996). Sinn (2008), however, argues that currently implemented demand-side policies would induce an increase, rather than a decrease, in current extraction and may thereby increase current emissions and speed up global warming, a result he termed a green policy paradox or green paradox for short.…”

Section: Theories Of the Green Paradox And The Demand For Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Going Full Circle: Demandside Constraints to the Green Paradox

Maria¹,

Lange²,

Werf³

2014

Climate Policy and Nonrenewable Resources

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We argue that the literature on the green paradox has largely ignored the demand side of the resource market, and that this side of the market may mitigate the size of an emissions increase in response to imperfect climate policies. These claims are informed by recent empirical findings. Our arguments lead to clear policy recommendations. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: Q310, Q380, Q580.

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“…Unsurprisingly, oligopolistic interaction has not been considered as a fundamental ingredient in modelling this issue. In fact, the backbone of the dynamic analysis carried out on this leitmotiv (Markusen, 1975;Sinclair, 1992Sinclair, , 1994Ulph and Ulph, 1994;Wirl, 1994;1995;Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996;Tahvonen, 1996;Rubio and Escriche, 2001) focusses on monopolistic extraction, where this single agent is a cartel (say, OPEC).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Lambertini

2014

SSRN Journal

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This paper o¤ers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a di¤erential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of …rms in the commons is also addressed.

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Depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts of global warming

Cited by 364 publications

References 13 publications

A Hotelling Model with a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution

A Hotelling Model with a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution

Going Full Circle: Demandside Constraints to the Green Paradox

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

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