On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Lambertini, Luca

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2519988

“…This extension would enrich the currently scant literature modelling the simultaneous presence of resource extraction (or stock removal) and environmental damage or global warming (cf. Lambertini and Leitmann, 2013;and Lambertini, 2016b).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

Lambertini

¹

2021

Energy Economics

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A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm's objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself.Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.

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“…For more on the dynamic analysis of natural resource exploitation, see Clark (1973Clark ( , 1990, Clemhout and Wan (1985a,b), Fischer and Mirman (1986), Cave (1987), Benhabib and Radner (1992), Karp (1992a,b), Dockner and Sorger (1996), Dawid and Kopel (1997) and Sorger (1998), among many others. The small literature on the interplay between polluting emissions and natural resource exploitation is reviewed in Lambertini and Leitmann (2013) and Lambertini (2016b); in this regard, see also Wirl ( , 2007, ,…”

Section: Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Games in Industrial Economics

Lambertini

¹

2018

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2 12 CONTENTS Chapter 9 is a mix of theory and applications meant to illustrate the delicate nature of the Stackelberg solution in di¤erential games. Actually, I might simply say 'games'without any further quali…cation, since the chapter sets out with a compact illustration of the original Cournot-Stackelberg model we are accustomed with from introductory textbooks in microeconomics, in order to outline the concept of time (in)consistency. This is then extensively discussed in the remainder of the chapter by illustrating the property of uncontrollability and the requirements for subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibria to arise under open-loop and feedback information. This discussion is complemented by examples based on games with sticky prices, advertising or taxation of polluting emissions in monopoly. A relatively wider space is for a theme which is widespread in the business and management literature, supply chain coordination, as this is a natural candidate for the analysis of the Stackelberg solution.At the end of each chapter, there appears a short paragraph o¤ering suggestions for further readings.

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Regulating the Tragedy of Commons: Nonlinear Feedback Solutions of a Differential Game with a Dual Interpretation

Lambertini

¹

2017

SSRN Journal

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A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm's objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself.Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.JEL Codes: C73, L13, Q20, Q53

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On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Cited by 3 publications

References 78 publications

Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

Differential Games in Industrial Economics

Regulating the Tragedy of Commons: Nonlinear Feedback Solutions of a Differential Game with a Dual Interpretation

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