ABSTRACT. We analyze a two-sector growth model with directed technical change where man-made capital and exhaustible resources are essential for production. The relative profitability of factor-specific innovations endogenously determines whether technical progress will be capital-or resource-augmenting. We show that any balanced growth equilibrium features purely resource-augmenting technical change. This result is compatible with alternative specifications of preferences and innovation technologies, as it hinges on the interplay between productive efficiency in the final sector, and the Hotelling rule characterizing the efficient depletion path for the exhaustible resource. Our result provides sound micro-foundations for the broad class of models of exogenous/endogenous growth where resource-augmenting progress is required to sustain consumption in the long run, contradicting the view that these models are conceptually biased in favor of sustainability.

Our paper focuses on the role of endogenous technology and technology spillovers in explaining cross country differences in pollution and the pollution haven effect of international trade. In our North-South trade model, technology is endogenously developed by the North and imitated by the South. Environmental regulators choose national environmental policies by trading off the income gains and the disutility from a rise in pollution. Differences in environmental stringency are entirely driven by differences in investment opportunities and distortions that follow from the difference in intellectual property rights protection. We show that without goods trade and in the absence of technology subsidies, the North imposes more stringent environmental regulation than the South. When opening up to trade, the South experiences a rise in prices for pollution-intensive goods and tends to raise pollution as in a standard trade model. Induced technical change, however, may reverse this pollution haven effect.

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The increase in carbondioxide emissions by some countries in reaction to an emission reduction by countries with climate policy (carbon leakage) is seen as a serious threat to unilateral climate policy. Using a two-country model where only one of the countries enforces an exogenous cap on emissions, this paper analyzes the effect of technical change that can be directed towards the clean or dirty input, on carbon leakage. We show that, as long as technical change cannot be directed, there will always be carbon leakage through the standard terms-of-trade effect. However, once we allow for directed technical change, a counterbalancing induced technology effect arises and carbon leakage will generally be lower. Moreover, we show that when the relative demand for energy is sufficiently elastic, carbon leakage may be negative: the technology effect induces the unconstrained region to voluntarily reduce its own emissions.JEL Classification: F18, O33, Q54, Q55.

We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and overallocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005)(2006)(2007) of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we estimate the counterfactual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions, we conclude that both overallocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inflation. Over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over-allocation of approximately 376 million EUAs (6%) and total abatement at the member state level of 107 Mt CO 2 (1.8%). However, due to over-allocation and possible uncertainty about future allocation methodologies, we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 119 Mt CO 2 (2%) occurred, resulting in emissions over the pilot phase being approximately 12 Mt CO 2 (0.2%) higher than they would have been in the absence of the EU ETS.JEL Classification: C23, O13, Q54, Q58

No abstract

We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and overallocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005)(2006)(2007) of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we estimate the counterfactual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions, we conclude that both overallocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inflation. Over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over-allocation of approximately 376 million EUAs (6%) and total abatement at the member state level of 107 Mt CO 2 (1.8%). However, due to over-allocation and possible uncertainty about future allocation methodologies, we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 119 Mt CO 2 (2%) occurred, resulting in emissions over the pilot phase being approximately 12 Mt CO 2 (0.2%) higher than they would have been in the absence of the EU ETS.JEL Classification: C23, O13, Q54, Q58

Despite the potential energy savings and economic benefits associated with compact fluorescent light bulbs, their adoption by the residential sector has been limited to date. In this paper, we present a theoretical model that focuses on the agents' ability to perceive the correct cost of lighting and on the role of environmental attitudes as key determinants of the adoption decision. We use original data from Ireland to test our theoretical predictions. Our results emphasize the importance of education, information and environmental awareness in the adoption decision.