Deliberate Indiscretion? How Political Corruption Encourages Discretionary Policy Making

Abstract

This article reports the first empirical evidence that politicians delegate to trusted bureaucrats to diminish political responsibility for policy. Political science has been perennially concerned with why political leaders delegate authority to bureaucrats, but this work's focus on advanced democracies has overlooked how corruption and political influence over bureaucrats can turn delegation into a means of obfuscating responsibility. Using a measure that differentiates political corruption from corruption at lower levels of government and a new data set of policy making on more than 600 European Commission directives in the 10 former communist European Union (EU) member states, I show that political-level corruption is associated with increased delegation to bureaucrats. This relationship between political corruption and bureaucratic discretion is conditional upon the political independence of the bureaucracy, such that politicians engaged in corruption delegate more to reduce clarity of responsibility only when they possess informal means to influence bureaucrats.

Determinants of corruption pressures on local government in the E.U.

“…Local units are getting more important tasks in providing public goods and services to citizens, and they dispose with greater financial resources (Governatori & Yim, 2012). Delegated responsibilities often go hand in hand with increased discretionary power which is in turn associated to higher corruption risk (Kwon 2014;Loftis 2015;Prud'homme, 1995;Tanzi 1995). The financial strength of the local environment, both business and local government might be tempting for corrupt agents.…”

“…Although some studies aimed to quantify corruption at the local level (e.g., Linhartov a & Volejn ıkov a, 2015), the incidence of corruption belongs to dark numbers and measuring the corruption prevalence at national and sub-national level remains highly subjective. Therefore, the reasoning of higher corruption risk at the sub-national level stems from the argument that local bureaucrats have more discretionary power and are more difficult to be controlled (Kwon, 2014;Loftis, 2015;Prud'homme, 1995;Tanzi, 1995). If motivated by personal benefits, the decisions of corrupt politicians and administration often collide with the public interest of local community.…”

Breaking the mold? Ministerial rotations, legislative production and political strategies in Lebanon

“…The discretion of ministers, however, is not only determined by the strength of formal institutions but also informal arrangements between ministers and bureaucrats. Loftis (2015), for example, shows how politicians' informal influence over bureaucrats can facilitate corrupt behavior and determines the extent to which politicians delegate responsibilities. According to Loftis, the more dependent bureaucrats are on politicians, ministers can use delegation to obfuscate responsibility for corruption.…”

Do Public Corruption Convictions Influence Citizens’ Trust in Government? The Answer Might Not Be a Simple Yes or No

“…Welch & Hibbing, 1997). Most studies applied survey instruments to measure corruption levels perceived by citizens (e.g., Chang & Chu, 2006; Chang & Kerr, 2016; Gong, Wang, & Ren, 2015; Knutsen, Kotsadam, Olsen, & Wig, 2017; Villoria et al, 2013), business managers (e.g., Loftis, 2015; J. Zhu & Zhang, 2016), or public employees or bureaucrats (e.g., Kwon, 2014; Moloney & Chu, 2016).…”