Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games

Abstract

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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

“…Kalandrakis (2004b) and Britz et al (2010Britz et al ( , 2014 study models in which the identity of the previous rejecter determines the distribution from which the new proposer is drawn. In Britz et al (2015) this distribution depends on the current state, which, in turn, depends on the previous state and rejecter. coalition partners in any SSP equilibrium.…”