Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

Ashraf, Nava; Bohnet, Iris; Piankov, Nikita

doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4

Cited by 529 publications

(441 citation statements)

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“…and agents' decision to be trustworthy is also reflected in the regressions using data only from the stranger (column 4) or from the friend pairing (columns 5 and 6), and is in line with previous evidence from trust games with strangers (e.g., Castillo and Carter, 2002;Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov, 2006). Furthermore, whereas friendship characteristics do not explain variation in trust among friends, agents are more likely to choose Trustworthy if they see their friend on a daily basis (column 6).…”

supporting

confidence: 88%

“…This measure is complemented with dummy variables indicating whether the participant volunteers for a non-profit organization and the frequency of lending money to friends (never, once or several times per year, or once a month or more). 13 We anticipate a positive relationship between each of these variables and trust (e.g., Castillo and Carter, 2002;Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov, 2006). Risk preferences were elicited through an attitudinal question in the post-experimental questionnaire.…”

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Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Binzel

Fehr

2013

Journal of Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 7183 January 2013 ABSTRACT Social Distance and Trust: Experimental Evidence from a Slum in Cairo *While strong social ties help individuals cope with missing institutions, trade is essentially limited to those who are part of the social network. We examine what makes the decision to trust a stranger different from the decision to trust a member of a given social network (a friend), by comparing the determinants of these two decisions for the same individual. We implement a binary trust game with hidden action in a lab-in-the-field experiment with residents of an informal housing area in Cairo. Our results show that trust is higher among friends than among strangers and that higher trust among friends is related to the principal's belief of trustworthiness. However, on average a principal underestimates her friend's trustworthiness leading to inefficient outcomes. Our findings suggest that even within a social network, trade may often be limited to exchanges with few information asymmetries. JEL Classification:C72, C93, D82, O12

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confidence: 99%

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Binzel

Fehr

2013

Journal of Development Economics

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“…Further data show that trust is correlated moderately at best with expectations that the trust will be honored (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009;Glaeser et al, 2000;Lazzarini, Madalozzo, Artes, & Siqueira, 2005) and not at all with a person's level of risk tolerance (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Plankov, 2006;Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010;Eckel & Wilson, 2004;Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009). To be sure, the role of expectation and risk tolerance in trust behavior cannot be totally dismissed, for some researchers find such a relationship (e.g., Evans & Krueger, 2011;Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010).…”

Section: The Issue: Excessive Trust Given Expectations and Risk Tolermentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Dunning¹,

Anderson²,

Schlösser³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

188

173

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Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue.

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“…Use of PAI in such experiments should be avoided in favor of between-subjects designs and OT. Ashraf et al (2006) use a within-subjects design, with two tasks including a trust game and risk game, and use PORnp (where a subject makes one decision in each treatment). The within-subjects design with PORnp has internal theoretical validity for EU but there can be cross-task contamination that biases data with this type of protocol, as has been reported in papers that tested for it.…”

Section: Examples Of Experiments On Social Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

2014

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Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We report treatments with different payoff mechanisms but the same decision tasks. The data show large differences across mechanisms in subjects' revealed risk preferences, a clear violation of isolation. We illustrate the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their implications for classical tests of theories of decision under risk. We discuss theoretical properties of commonly used mechanisms, and new mechanisms introduced herein, in order to clarify which mechanisms are theoretically incentive compatible for which theories. We identify behavioral properties of some mechanisms that can introduce bias in elicited risk preferences-from cross-task contaminationeven when the mechanism used is theoretically incentive compatible. We explain that selection of a payoff mechanism is an important component of experimental design in many topic areas including social preferences, public goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity as well as experiments on decisions under risk.

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Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

Cited by 529 publications

References 32 publications

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk

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