Decision making and coordination of fresh agriculture product supply chain considering fairness concerns

Yan, Bo; Chen, Yanru; He, Shiyou

doi:10.1051/ro/2019031

Cited by 22 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(37 reference statements)

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“…Firstly, both the manufacturer and retailer are supposed to pay attention to fairness simultaneously in the low-carbon supply chain as discussed by Zou et al [10] and Li and Lai [7,48]. e similar occurred in the green supply chain by Yang et al [49], apparel supply chain by Adhikari and Bisi [50], agricultural product supply chain by Yan et al [51], and dual-channel supply chain by Zhen et al [52] no matter whatever the bargaining structure by Jiang et al [53] and Pan et al [54]. Secondly, dual fairness is rendered to the general contractor and the subcontractor in the construction supply chain as discussed by Jiang et al [55], the functional logistics service provider and logistics service integrator by Du and Han [56], the manufacturer and the network platform of e-commerce supply chain by Wang et al [35], and the supplier and the retailer with competitors by Li et al [57].…”

Section: Fairness Concerns In Supplymentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational Strategy for Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Wei

Qin

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Carbon emission reduction has become a common hot topic around the world. Although the previous literature has proven that the asymmetric information and fairness concerns would influence the operational strategy for low-carbon supply chain, it hardly touched the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, which contradicted practical observations and experimental evidence. Incorporating the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, this paper investigates a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with discrete types including selfish S-type and fairness-concerned F-type. The manufacturer can observe and thereby know the behavioral type of the retailer in the scenario of symmetric information, while it cannot in the scenario of asymmetric information. In the approach of game theory, the optimal carbon emission reducing strategy and pricing strategy in the symmetric scenario and asymmetric scenario are achieved successively. By comparing the above two scenarios, the impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns at the individual level and systematic level are analyzed, respectively. A case study is offered before concluding some implications for the supply chain management. The findings include the following: Firstly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns enhances the carbon emission reduction significantly. Although the fairness concerns alone decrease the carbon emission reduction, the asymmetric information increases with the dominating power. Secondly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns raises the wholesale price and retail price dramatically. Although the impact of either fairness concerns or asymmetric information randomly changes with the behavioral type and information structure, their interactive impacts are stable and change smoothly. Thirdly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns promotes a fairer profit distribution, while either fairness concerns or asymmetric information alone hardly changes the overall profit of the low-carbon supply chain.

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Section: Fairness Concerns In Supplymentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational Strategy for Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Wei

Qin

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…However, quality loss and quantity loss capture the main features of fresh products in transportation and delivery [22]. To achieve supply chain coordination, many scholars have used different contracts to optimize the fresh-keeping and pricing decisions of supply chain members [23][24][25][26][27][28]. e above documents considered the cost of double loss in the decision-making but did not further study the specific impact of double loss on the optimal decisions.…”

Section: Deteriorating Item Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Decision and Coordination of Fresh E-Commerce Supply Chain Considering Double Loss

Bai

Liu

2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Motivated by a large amount of quality loss and quantity loss of fresh products during transportation, this paper examines the effect of the double loss on decisions and profits by establishing models for a fresh e-commerce supply chain consisting of one online retailer and one third-party logistics provider. The online retailer sells fresh products and provides compensation for quantity loss. TPL’s fresh-keeping effort during transportation can effectively reduce the double loss. We find that: (i) under the centralized model, the basic quantity loss rate and freshness sensitivity can improve fresh-keeping effort. The online retailer prefers price-raising strategies as the basic quantity loss rate increases and freshness sensitivity decreases. But, if fresh-keeping cost is within a certain range and the basic quantity loss rate is high enough, the online retailer prefers price reduction strategies. If fresh-keeping cost is high, as freshness sensitivity increases, the retailer first reduces prices and then raises prices. (ii) Under the decentralized model, as the basic quantity loss rate and freshness sensitivity increase, product price will increase. (iii) Centralized decision-making mode is more profitable to the supply chain. Furthermore, we design a “two-way cost sharing-revenue sharing” contract to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement.

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“…The result shows that the effect of subsidy on the farmer's profits depends on their level of risk aversion. Yan et al [48] integrate the fairness concern of the manufacturer into a supply chain of fresh agricultural products and investigate the influence of fairness behavior of the manufacturer on the optimal decision of fresh agricultural products supply chain.…”

Section: Agricultural Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal strategies for a capital constrained contract-farming supply chain with yield insurance

2021

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We consider a capital-constrained contract-farming supply chain with a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral agro-dealer, where the farmer faces some yield uncertainty that can be covered by insurance. Using the Stackelberg model, we derive the optimal strategies on the insured level, production and wholesale price. The result shows that farmers with low risk aversion tend not to be insured, while those with high risk aversion tend to insure. Further analysis indicates that, as the degree of the farmer's risk aversion increases, the farm size decreases, but the yield per unit area and the wholesale price of the agricultural product increases. In addition, yield insurance and premium subsidies can lead to a decrease of the yield per unit area. However, the expansion of the farm size can compensate for the inhibitory effect of the decrease of yield per unit area on the total yield, and thus the total yield increases. We also find that when the premium subsidy rate is low, the yield insurance's value to farmers is negative. Moreover, the yield insurance's value to farmers increases with respect to the bank's interest rate.

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Decision making and coordination of fresh agriculture product supply chain considering fairness concerns

Cited by 22 publications

References 41 publications

Operational Strategy for Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Operational Strategy for Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Optimal Decision and Coordination of Fresh E-Commerce Supply Chain Considering Double Loss

Optimal strategies for a capital constrained contract-farming supply chain with yield insurance

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