We take the forest insurance supply chain, composed of a forestry enterprise and an insurance company, as the research object. The forestry carbon sink, operated by the forestry enterprise, is the subject matter of insurance. The Stackelberg game model is constructed to study the optimal strategies of the forestry enterprise and insurance company under the forest insurance mechanism, as well as the impact of government subsidies, probability of deforestation, and carbon limit level on the decision-making and profit of the forestry enterprise and insurance company. The results show that the larger the carbon limit, the looser carbon restraint policy, which causes the forestry enterprise to reduce the scale of carbon sink forest, and the insurance company lowers the premium level. As the probability of deforestation increases, both the scale of the carbon sink forest and the premium level will decrease. Direct subsidies for the premiums of the forestry enterprise are conducive to expanding the scale of carbon sink forest, but will lead to the insurance company improving the premium level. Providing indirect subsidies to the insurance company’s operating costs will not only expand the scale of the carbon sink forest, but also lower the premium level. In the case of the same number of premium subsidies, indirect subsidies are more effective than direct subsidies in increasing the forestry enterprise’s income and promoting it to expand the forest scale.
This paper explores the quantity discount coordination models in the fashion supply chain with uncertain yields and random demand. The paper proves that, under the independent and noncoordinated decision patterns, there exists a Nash equilibrium between the supplier and the manufacturer which reduces the supply chain's profit margin. In order to achieve the “optimal” centralized supply chain expected profit margin, new quantity discount models have been established. Both the supplier-oriented and the manufacturer-oriented Stackelberg supply chain gaming models are investigated. Our analytical and numerical analyses show that the quantity discount contract proposed in this paper can largely reduce the negative influence brought by the uncertainty of yields and demand. Therefore, the profit margin of supply chains based on quantity discount can reach the optimal level of the supply chain under the centralized setting.
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