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2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.013
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Dark trading and price discovery

Abstract: a b s t r a c tRegulators globally are concerned that dark trading harms price discovery. We show that dark trades are less informed than lit trades. High levels of dark trading increase adverse selection risk on the lit exchange by increasing the concentration of informed traders. Using both high-and low-frequency measures of informational efficiency we find that low levels of non-block dark trading are benign or even beneficial for informational efficiency, but high levels are harmful. In contrast, we find n… Show more

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Cited by 162 publications
(64 citation statements)
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References 62 publications
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“…This result is consistent with findings by Hatheway et al (2016) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) who show that orders executing in dark trading venues are predominantly uninformed. As a consequence, adverse selection risk and bid-ask spreads in lit markets increase when the level of dark trading is high.…”
Section: Related Literaturesupporting
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This result is consistent with findings by Hatheway et al (2016) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) who show that orders executing in dark trading venues are predominantly uninformed. As a consequence, adverse selection risk and bid-ask spreads in lit markets increase when the level of dark trading is high.…”
Section: Related Literaturesupporting
confidence: 93%
“…However, while the findings in Conrad et al (2003), Hatheway et al (2016), Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) and Garvey et al (2016) support the predictions the model makes for low levels of adverse selection, the cross-sectional results in Ready (2014) are consistent with the model's implications for high levels of adverse selection. The latter statement also applies to the results reported in Nimalendran and Ray (2014) who present evidence that informed investors split their trades across dark and lit venues.…”
Section: Related Literaturesupporting
confidence: 51%
“…For cap tier 1–200, we use the average bid‐ask spreads for the stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 over the month of December 2013. The estimated bid‐ask spread for cap tier 201–500 is based on our estimate for 1–200 and the estimate for 1–500 obtained from Comerton‐Forde and Putnins (). The total transaction cost is the two‐way turnover for the cap tier multiplied by the sum of the assumed commission (20 bp) and half of the bid‐ask spread – we assume that trade requires on average to cross half of the spread.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… The latter figure is based on the Comerton‐Forde and Putnins (), who observed the average bid‐ask spread for the All Ordinaries over the period February 2008 to October 2011 was 129 bp. …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Information efficiency involves different dimensions, one of which is the timeliness of price adjustment. In this section, I analyze the degree of price discovery measured by a measure of price delay, as applied by Hou and Moskowitz (2005), Comerton-Forde andPutniņš (2015), andCarrion (2013).…”
Section: Robustness Checksmentioning
confidence: 99%