Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.

A new technique for estimating market power in several markets simultaneously is developed and applied to the Australian retail beef, lamb, and pork markets. The hypotheses that market power is zero and that market power is the same for each meat cannot be rejected. Nor is there evidence that market power increased over the period of analysis. Little bias is created by examining markets is isolation, rather than within a system, when markets are competitive, but that bias can be large when market power exists in some markets in the system.

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A market-neutral strategy that is long [short] stocks with a high [low] Piotroski F-score generates an index-weighted 0.8 percent pm on S&P/ASX 200 stocks and 1.4 percent pm on smaller stocks. Equal-weighted returns are higher and in all cases returns are statistically significant. However, the Carhart model alphas are not statistically significant except in the case of equal-weighted small cap portfolios. For such portfolios, however, most of the alpha comes from the short side and most institutional investors would find them uninvestable due to capacity constraints. A range of tests indicate that analyst neglect does not explain the F-score premium.

This paper studies the multinational firm's choice of transfer prices when the firm uses separate transfer prices for tax and managerial incentive purposes, and when there is penalty for non-compliance with the arm's length principle. The optimal incentive transfer price is shown to be a weighted average of marginal cost and the optimal tax transfer price plus an adjustment by a fraction of the marginal penalty for nonarm's length pricing. Insofar as the tax rates are different in different jurisdictions, the firm optimally trades off the benefits of tax arbitrage against the penalty for non-arm's length pricing.