Currency board et stabilité macroéconomique : le cas de la Bulgarie

Abstract

[eng] The paper reviews basic features of the currency board arrangement (CBA) as a monetary system and the peculiarities of the Bulgarian model. The impact of the CBA on different institutional sectors and on the remonetization of the economy is commented. The external vulnerability of the CBA is assessed. What is left for the central bank is discussed: it is argued that, paradoxically, a greater autonomy is attained at the cost of the amputation of several « classical » functions of the monetary authority. The paper discusses two possible « exit strategies » from a CBA : a return to exchange rate flexibility and a full fledges central bank ; a monetary union. It is argued that for Bulgaria, the natural way-out is to adopt the Euro at the moment of the admission to the EU, by skipping the ERM-II phase. JEL Code : E58 [fre] Ce texte examine les caractéristiques du système monétaire de currency board et les particularités du modèle bulgare, introduit en juillet 1997. Son impact sur les secteurs institutionnels et sur la remonétisation de l'économie est commentée. Sa vulnérabilité est évaluée. Ce qui demeure du rôle de la banque centrale dans un système de currency board est discuté : on montre que, paradoxalement, une plus grande autonomie est le pendant de la disparition des plusieurs fonctions « classiques » de l'autorité monétaire. Le texte analyse deux stratégies de sortie du currency board : d'une part le retour à la flexibilité des taux de change et à une banque centrale à part entière; d'autre part une union monétaire. Il est montré que pour la Bulgarie, qui est candidate à l'adhésion à l'Union européenne, la sortie naturelle du currency board est d'adopter l'euro dès son accession, en omettant la phase II du SME.

Sustainability of the Currency Board in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Conditions of a Negative Interest Rate on the Reserve Currency

“…There is an extensive literature on the currency board, which, according to the subject of analysis, can be grouped into several sections: (a) the papers that simultaneously describe, compare and argue the advantages and disadvantages of the currency board (e.g. Greaves, 1954;Birnbaum, 1957;Ow, 1985;Schuler, 1992Schuler, , 1996Williamson, 1995;Avramov, 2000;Rodriguez, 2000;Berger and Fraassen, 2001;Haan, 2001;Hanke and Schuler, 2015). In these papers, especially favourite topics are the advantage of the currency board in ensuring the stability of prices and exchange rates of the domestic currency, and the profitability of investing the reserve currency.…”

“…Although the monetization of the budget deficit is contrary to the basic principles of the constitution of the European Union (EU) and the anti-inflationary consistency of the European Central Bank (ECB), after the failure of the austerity policy, it has become the most important policy of mitigating the crisis 1 . After the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, the monetization of government deficits became an almost generally accepted measure to mitigate the effects of the crisis 2 . Economic policy measures aimed at addressing the causes of the 2008 crisis can no longer be distinguished from measures to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 crisis.…”