Cross-Ethnic Voting: An Index of Centripetal Electoral Systems

Abstract

Centripetal approaches to democracy in divided societies seek to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation by making politicians dependent on the electoral support of groups other than their own base. Such cross-ethnic voting stands in contrast to situations where politicians need only the support of their own co-ethnics to win elections. This distinction can be used to evaluate the utility of centripetal electoral systems in promoting voting across ethnic divides. To do so, this article begins by considering some critiques of centripetalism, showing that cross-ethnic voting is more common in both institutional design and actual practice than some critics believe. It then moves on to examine cases of cross-ethnic voting via ethnically designated party lists, cross-regional party formation rules, at-large communal or sectoral seat reservations, and uni-directional vote-pooling, using these cases to construct an index of strong, moderate and weak centripetal electoral systems.

From Dayton to Bernese Jura: The Election of the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…Centripetalism favors alternative vote (AV) and single transferable vote (STV) with all their variations. Reilly (2020) makes a three‐way distinction within centripetalism. First, “strong centripetalism” requires multi‐ethnic parties, multi‐directional vote pooling, and in some cases cross‐ethnic appealing is mandatory.…”

“…Moreover, “moderate centripetalism” encourages cross‐ethnic voting, but it may request the formalization of ethnic quotas. Finally, “weak centripetalism” focuses “on guaranteeing representation to specific ethnic minorities within broader majority‐dominated bodies” which could be considered as tokenistic (Reilly, 2020: 13). Among the latter, Reilly gives the example of geometric mean that is applied to the election of the seat representing the French‐speaking Jura Bernese in the seven‐members Swiss Canton of Bern government, which he defines as a weak centripetal vote pooling system (Reilly, 2020: 14) that exists exclusively for the executive elections in Bern (Mueller et al, 2019: 166; Bogaards, 2019: 522).…”

“…However, the risk that this approach goes wrong is high, especially when there are two ethnic groups, one of whom is significantly larger than the other, and so it elects the seat(s) of the least numerous group. Reilly (2020: 14) and Bogaards (2019: 529–530) define the approach to the election of the Croat seat as “cross‐ethnic voting” and “uni‐directional vote pooling,” which occurs when the bigger determines the winner of the smaller ethnic group. On the other hand, the latter has not shown any real interest to influence the election of the candidates of the more numerous group.…”

Cross‐ethnic appeals in plural democracies

“…Yet, a growing number of studies have cast doubt on the ubiquity of ethnic block voting, even in deeply divided societies (Devasher, 2019;Ichino & Nathan, 2013;Reilly, 2020). Scholars have recognized that ethnic parties often do need to build cross-ethnic links and reach out beyond their established ethnic bases in order to win elections in ethnically diverse states.…”

“…Politicians face credibility disadvantages when addressing noncore voters and risk alienating core supporters and are vulnerable to being outbid by competitors. For example, Jakarta's Christian governor Ahok was accused of blasphemy in 2016 for suggesting that Muslims can be represented by non-Muslims (Reilly, 2020). In Bosnia, presidential candidate Zeljko Komsic-an ethnic Croat-has repeatedly come under fire for courting Bosniak voters and has had his legitimacy questioned by his own community (Kasapovi c, 2016).…”