Court and Parties: Evolution and Problems of Political Funding in Germany

Saalfeld, Thomas

doi:10.1057/9780333978061_5

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Por último, los partidos políticos no son los únicos agentes de las reformas de su financiación. En algunos países, el sistema judicial suele modificar las reformas legales aprobadas por los partidos, como ha ocurrido en Alemania (Saafeld, 2000), Canadá (Young, 1998) y Estados Unidos (Sorauf, 1994;Smith, 2001). Sin embargo, en general, la dicotomía de Scarrow es útil para aclarar por qué algunas normas Reis.…”

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“…Additionally, political parties are not the only agents of political finance reforms. There are countries in which the judiciary use to change the legal reforms passed by parties, as has occurred in Germany (Saafeld, 2000), Canada (Young 1998) and the United States (Sorauf, 1994;Smith, 2001). However, all in all, Scarrow's dichotomy is helpful in clarifying why certain norms related to parties' income are discussed and adopted when the legal framework of political finance is revised and this might explain its frequent use by the literature.…”

Section: Citationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reformas de la financiación política para preservar los ingresos de los partidos evidencia de tres reformas españolas

Viñuela¹

2024

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Búsqueda de rentas • Donaciones políticas • España • Financiación de los partidos • Reformas de la financiación políticaResumen Los partidos políticos se enfrentan a un dilema en la regulación del dinero político. Diversas pruebas indican que algunos partidos exigen contribuciones por los contratos y las ventajas especiales que conceden al sector privado. Sin embargo, en las reformas de la financiación política que aprueban tras los escándalos de financiación irregular, establecen límites estrictos a las donaciones políticas de las empresas para agradar a los votantes. Un modo de resolver esta aparente contradicción sin renunciar a su capacidad de monetizar el poder político es insertar en las leyes de reforma escapatorias y excepciones para eludir las restricciones formales impuestas a las donaciones a los partidos. Este artículo examina tres reformas sucesivas de la financiación política en España y encuentra en ellas disposiciones compatibles con esta lógica de preservación de ingresos. AbstractPolitical parties face a dilemma in the regulation of political money. Evidence from different sources shows that some parties demand contributions for public works contracts and special advantages that they grant to the private sector. Yet in the political finance reforms enacted in the aftermath of funding scandals, parties impose strict limits on corporate donations to please voters. A way to unravel this apparent contradiction while protecting the ability to monetize political power is to insert in the party funding reforms a number of loopholes and exceptions to legally donate to parties by circumventing the restrictions set on political money. This paper examines three successive reforms of the Spanish party funding regime and finds that the three reform acts contain provisions consistent with this income-preserving logic. 4Reformas de la financiación política para preservar los ingresos de los partidos: evidencia de tres reformas españolas IntroduccIón 1 La regulación de la financiación política basada en el interés público justifica la intervención del Estado para lograr algunos objetivos que son valiosos para la sociedad, pero inalcanzables en un régimen de laissez faire. Uno de esos objetivos es promover la equidad en las elecciones contribuyendo a nivelar las oportunidades de los partidos de persuadir a los votantes, bien fijando límites al gasto electoral o con ayudas públicas a las candidaturas electorales (Casas Zamora, 2005). Otro motivo para subvencionar a los partidos es resolver un problema de acción colectiva : el que plantea la propensión de los ciudadanos a no contribuir voluntariamente a la financiación de los bienes públicos que proporcionan los partidos, tales como la representación de las preferencias políticas y los servicios de gobierno.En lugar del interés público, los grupos sociales pueden buscar la regulación para que sirva el interés privado de sus miembros, como en la tradición de economía política de la Escuela de Chicago (Stigler, 1971;Posner, 1975). El área de la financiación política...

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Section: Citationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reformas de la financiación política para preservar los ingresos de los partidos evidencia de tres reformas españolas

Viñuela¹

2024

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“…French democracy has been tarred by politicians' accumulation of elected posts (cumul des mandats) and the associated tendency towards clientelism and the misappropriation of public funds by local politicians; it has also been scandalised at times by amnesties for politicians caught up in corruption (Fay, 1995;Mény, 1996). German politics has also seen its fair share of alleged financial impropriety, whether in respect of MPs' extra-parliamentary incomes or the award of Länder and local contracts, not to mention allegations of plagiarised doctoral theses (Saalfeld, 2000;Seibel, 1997;Scarrow, 2003). And the reputations of senior politicians in all three countries have been tarnished by numerous party funding scandals and dishonest and sometimes illegal attempts to raise campaign finance.…”

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confidence: 99%

Honesty above all else? Expectations and perceptions of political conduct in three established democracies

2016

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Many citizens across the liberal democratic world are highly critical of their elected representatives' conduct. Drawing on original survey data from Britain, France and Germany, this paper offers a unique insight into prevailing attitudes across Europe's three largest democracies. It finds remarkable consistencies in the ethical priorities of British, French and German citizens: although there is some individual-level variation, respondents in all three countries overwhelmingly prioritise having honest representatives. It also finds differences in the types of behaviour that cause most concern in each country. The paper then examines how individuals' preferences shape their concerns about prevailing standards. The findings 2 are consistent with the idea that citizens' predispositions have an 'anchoring' effect on perceptions of political integrity. Finally, the paper considers whether established democracies are susceptible to an 'expectations gap' between citizens' expectations of conduct and what 'normal' politics can realistically deliver.

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“…Examples exist to show that monitoring the finances of political parties is a problem even in advanced democracies. For instance, there have been problems in observing the financial dealings of political parties in the United Kingdom (Pinto-Duschinsky 1989;Fisher 2000); the United States (Alexander 1989;McSweeney 2000); Canada (Palthiel 1989); Germany (Saalfeld 2000); Italy (Ciaurro 1989) and so on. Notwithstanding this intricacy, it does not diminish the ability of any country to develop a system that is capable of subduing the negative influence of money on its electoral process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taming a Lion: Barriers to Monitoring Campaign Finances of Political Parties Prior to the 2015 Elections in Nigeria

2019

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The role of money is germane to the survival of political parties and the conduct of their campaigns during electioneering periods. In fact, electoral processes in liberal democracies cannot end successfully bereft of requisite finances. However, this does not warrant the excessive deployment and vile use of money in the electoral process thus, contravening acceptable ethical standards. This is why in all democratic climes, there exist rules that guide against illicit acquisition and utilization of funds by political parties in financing their activities. The Nigerian democratic scenario is not different from this general norm as there are electoral laws that parties should observe in their quest to obtain finances to execute their programmes. These laws also specify penalties the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) can use in punishing erring political parties. In the build-up to the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, did the political parties adhere to existing laws while generating funds? Did the INEC adequately monitor how the political parties expend money during their campaigns? This paper examines and attempts to answer these questions by qualitatively analyzing the conduct of political parties with regards to their campaign funds before the 2015 polls. It assesses INEC's efforts at monitoring their finances and the obstacles hampering the process in Nigeria and proffers solutions to the hydraheaded problem of monitoring the finances of political parties in the country.

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Court and Parties: Evolution and Problems of Political Funding in Germany

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

Reformas de la financiación política para preservar los ingresos de los partidos evidencia de tres reformas españolas

Reformas de la financiación política para preservar los ingresos de los partidos evidencia de tres reformas españolas

Honesty above all else? Expectations and perceptions of political conduct in three established democracies

Taming a Lion: Barriers to Monitoring Campaign Finances of Political Parties Prior to the 2015 Elections in Nigeria

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