This article contributes to the debate over the fashionable but contested concept of 'territorial cohesion' in the European Union. Scholars have long recognised and traced discursive shifts in EU territorial development policies, but theoretical accounts of the drivers and parameters of such shifts are rare. This article applies the multiple streams model of agenda-setting to the territorial cohesion debate in order to explore how useful this model is in analysing and predicting the outcome of a debate. The article is structured according to the three 'streams' that are relevant to agenda-setting: problems, policies and politics. The analysis relies on the responses to the 2008 Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion in order to determine how politically feasible different policy solutions are. More recent developments such as the Territorial Agenda 2020 and the European Commission's proposals for Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020 are then used to assess the predictive power of multiple streams. It is shown that the model successfully predicts the endurance of solidarity-based cohesion goals, the emergence of territorial capital as a key policy solution, and the rejection of geographical criteria for the allocation of EU Structural Funds. At the same time, the multiple streams model fails to predict the introduction of spatial planning tools into EU cohesion policy. This shows that explaining a substantial redefinition of existing policy terms requires some reference to key actors' broader discursive strategies. The article concludes that the multiple streams model has some predictive and explanatory power; criticisms of the model as overly descriptive are exaggerated.
This paper examines cross-national differences in the development of sectoral collective bargaining in the European telecommunications industry following comparable changes in market regulations. We seek to explain why centralized, coordinated bargaining institutions were established in Austria and Sweden, both within incumbent telecommunications firms and at the sector level, while Germany and Denmark experienced decentralization and disorganization of bargaining at both levels. We argue that these outcomes were the result of differences in institutional loopholes that employers were able to exploit to avoid centralized bargaining and past union structures that influenced patterns of inter-union cooperation. These two explanatory factors were interrelated: the presence or absence of institutional loopholes affected the basis for cooperation between unions, while labor cooperation was an important power resource that unions could draw on to close emerging loopholes. Findings demonstrate the importance of sector-level political dynamics for the construction or erosion of solidaristic bargaining structures under pressure from market liberalization.
Enlighten-Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk No sex scandals please, we're French: French attitudes towards politicians' public and private conduct
Abstract:This article develops and applies a new framework for analyzing the relationship between institutions, cost structures, and patterns of labor-management contestation over organizational boundaries. Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center jobs are compared across ten incumbent telecommunications firms located in Europe and the USA. All ten firms moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and domestic and offshore subcontractors. However, a subset of the firms later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases following negotiated concessions on pay and conditions for internal workers. We argue that variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of cost differentials between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn affected patterns of contestation associated with externalization measures. Findings are based on 147 interviews with management and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures and associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered through collective agreements and surveys. These two research streams focus on different mechanisms connecting institutional environments to the boundary strategies of firms. The first examines how institutions at national and company level affect cost structures associated with externalizing work; while the second asks how and why worker representatives develop alternative strategies toward externalization decisions, and then access different power resources to exert influence over these decisions. In this paper, we incorporate both of these mechanisms into a framework for analyzing the relationship between institutions, cost structures, and the political dynamics associated with labor-management negotiations over organizational boundaries. We focus on two principal dimensions of cost structures that differ across institutional settings: the cost differential between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships. Different combinations of these two factors are hypothesized to affect patterns of contestation between employers and worker representatives over externalization decisions.1 Vidal (2011: 284) defines externalization as a "reversal of the general tendency of Fordism to internalize processes and employment." We use the term here to refer to the process of moving work across organizational boundaries, from internal workplaces or employers to workplaces or employers that have contract-based relationships with these firms. 3We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework in explaining differences in how worker representatives respond to changing boundary strategies for call center jobs, based on findings from a ten country comparative study of incumbent telecommunications firms. We show that unions and works councils placed the highest strategic priority on opposing or reversing externalization in those cases characterized by both large differences in labor costs betwe...
Many citizens across the liberal democratic world are highly critical of their elected representatives' conduct. Drawing on original survey data from Britain, France and Germany, this paper offers a unique insight into prevailing attitudes across Europe's three largest democracies. It finds remarkable consistencies in the ethical priorities of British, French and German citizens: although there is some individual-level variation, respondents in all three countries overwhelmingly prioritise having honest representatives. It also finds differences in the types of behaviour that cause most concern in each country. The paper then examines how individuals' preferences shape their concerns about prevailing standards. The findings 2 are consistent with the idea that citizens' predispositions have an 'anchoring' effect on perceptions of political integrity. Finally, the paper considers whether established democracies are susceptible to an 'expectations gap' between citizens' expectations of conduct and what 'normal' politics can realistically deliver.
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