Could KK Be OK?

Greco, Daniel

doi:10.5840/jphil2014111411

Cited by 67 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…8 Our picture is broadly inspired by 'normal conditions' approaches to knowledge. Greco's (2014) and Salnaker's (2015) defenses of KK against objections arising from considerations of reliability or margins for error are examples of such approaches. Goodman (2013, Sect. 3) argues that, whatever one thinks about margin for error principles, there is a distinct normality-theoretic condition on knowledge.…”

Section: Modelling Kk and Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking a chance on KK

Goodman¹,

Salow

2017

Philos Stud

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Section: Modelling Kk and Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking a chance on KK

Goodman¹,

Salow

2017

Philos Stud

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“…27 In the previous section, I have addressed the following two questions: first, what is the object of this further inquiry? Greco (2014) has recently offered a novel defense of the KK-principle. Providing an answer to the first question will enable us to answer the second question, thereby shedding light on why Gary's first-order knowledge is empirical, yet his second-order knowledge is not an instance of armchair knowledge as intended by Silins. In the scenario originally described, Gary knows that the dial reads 0.4 simply by looking at it.…”

Section: Second-order Knowledge Through Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Armchair Access and Imagination

Fratantonio

2018

Dialectica

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In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins, and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.1 Henceforth, when I refer to Externalism, I have in mind what here I call, following Silins, Evidential Externalism, rather than more traditional varieties of externalism about epistemic justification, e.g., process reliabilism. For an overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism, see Fratantonio (forthcoming).

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“…This contextualist version of safety, in which iterations of safety can follow trivially from first‐order safety, fits in nicely with extant contextualist accounts of knowledge. As I argue in Greco (), a broadly Lewisian contextualist framework can be used to defend the KK principle—the thesis that if a subject knows that P, then she knows that she knows that P . And the reasons why it can be defended in this framework are structurally very similar to the reasons why iterations of robustness and safety can come for free in the contextualist picture we've been exploring—on the view I defend in my (2014), knowing requires avoiding error in a contextually determined set of cases, but which cases those are doesn't itself systematically vary with the case, but only with the context.…”

Section: Iterationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Greco

2016

Philosophical Issues

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This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with different conceptions of safety in epistemology. Lastly, and most controversially, there's an attractive choice at this point that will not vindicate some of the most influential applications of the safety‐theoretic framework in epistemology, e.g., Williamson's (2000) arguments against the KK principle, and luminosity.

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Could KK Be OK?

Cited by 67 publications

References 27 publications

Taking a chance on KK

Taking a chance on KK

Armchair Access and Imagination

Safety, Explanation, Iteration

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