2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.03.002
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Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

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Cited by 533 publications
(415 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
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“…For example, the relation between state ownership and executive pay is either negative (Adithipyangkul & Zhang, 2011;Conyon & He, 2011Firth et al, 2007) or insignificant Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006a;Markoczy et al, 2013). The same is true about the relation between state ownership and executive turnover.…”
Section: Internal Mechanism: Ownership Structurementioning
confidence: 91%
“…For example, the relation between state ownership and executive pay is either negative (Adithipyangkul & Zhang, 2011;Conyon & He, 2011Firth et al, 2007) or insignificant Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006a;Markoczy et al, 2013). The same is true about the relation between state ownership and executive turnover.…”
Section: Internal Mechanism: Ownership Structurementioning
confidence: 91%
“…To our knowledge no previous studies have explored the practice of setting up CCs in China, nor have they explored CEO compensation in China for the length of time we do here (Buck et al ., 2008;Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2007;Firth et al ., 2006;Kato and Long, 2006). For this study we developed a unique dataset of corporate interlocks among listed firms.…”
Section: Methods Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although boards can appoint CEOs and decide their pay, breaching the implicit norms of seniority and (near) equality with workers can easily trigger public outrage concerning 'unfair' income distribution. This outcry can trigger the intervention of officials (Adithipyangkul et al ., 2011;Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006). One form of state intervention is to manipulate access to state-controlled resources by punishing firms that deviate too significantly from the state's political and socio-economic priorities, including the goal to maintain social harmony and avoid public outrage (Firth et al ., 2010).…”
Section: Empirical Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…This extends our understanding of the governance roles of executive compensation beyond the confines of agency framework. Research in other Asian countries have also shown stakeholder influence on executive pay in South Korea (Kato, Kim, & Lee, 2005) or the importance of relationship and network influences in China (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006;Kato & Long, 2006), even despite newer elements of ''stock market capitalism'' after the Chinese economic reforms. Buck, Liu & Skovoroda (2008: 4) suggest that "Chinese institutions (including culture as an informal institution) may have inhibited the adoption of long-term incentives in the form of equity-based pay, and thus reduced the responsiveness of pay to share price performance.…”
Section: Executive Compensation Debates and Informal Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%