2013
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2072
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Social network contingency, symbolic management, and boundary stretching

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Cited by 121 publications
(97 citation statements)
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References 98 publications
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“…Given that the listed firms in China are characterized by ownership concentration and the dominance of controlling shareholders, this agency argument may not apply because CEOs with duality may still have limited power over the large controlling shareholders who usually can decide whether to combine the CEO and board chair positions. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with this prediction, showing that duality does not decrease CEO turnover (Chang & Wong, 2009;Lau et al, 2007) or increase CEO compensation Conyon & He, 2011Markoczy et al, 2013). Other studies also find no evidence that duality increases financial fraud and earnings management (Chen et al, 2006;Firth et al, 2011;Liu & Lu, 2007;Yuan et al, 2008) or decreases firm performance (Huang & Zhao, 2008;Li & Naughton, 2007;Shen & Lin, 2009).…”
Section: Internal Mechanism: Boards Of Directorsmentioning
confidence: 77%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Given that the listed firms in China are characterized by ownership concentration and the dominance of controlling shareholders, this agency argument may not apply because CEOs with duality may still have limited power over the large controlling shareholders who usually can decide whether to combine the CEO and board chair positions. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with this prediction, showing that duality does not decrease CEO turnover (Chang & Wong, 2009;Lau et al, 2007) or increase CEO compensation Conyon & He, 2011Markoczy et al, 2013). Other studies also find no evidence that duality increases financial fraud and earnings management (Chen et al, 2006;Firth et al, 2011;Liu & Lu, 2007;Yuan et al, 2008) or decreases firm performance (Huang & Zhao, 2008;Li & Naughton, 2007;Shen & Lin, 2009).…”
Section: Internal Mechanism: Boards Of Directorsmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…For example, the relation between state ownership and executive pay is either negative (Adithipyangkul & Zhang, 2011;Conyon & He, 2011Firth et al, 2007) or insignificant Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006a;Markoczy et al, 2013). The same is true about the relation between state ownership and executive turnover.…”
Section: Internal Mechanism: Ownership Structurementioning
confidence: 90%
“…For instance, Peng (2012) known to be the fastest firm growth strategy. Since CEOs' compensation is significantly determined by the size of the firm, they have a strong incentive to make their firms bigger (Markoczy, Sun, Peng, Shi, & Ren, 2013). This seems a plausible hypothesis given the generally low quality of corporate governance in EE (Filatochev et al, 2013;Globerman et al, 2011).…”
Section: Managerial Self-interest and Hubrismentioning
confidence: 96%
“…This directly contributes to the literature on sensemaking, which is yet to examine the effect of efforts at sensegiving, accomplished via language, on the sensemakers (Weick et al, ). These results could have important implications for the emerging stream of research in strategic management that focuses on the symbolic management of organizational stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, ; Markóczy et al, ; Westphal and Zajac, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 82%