Controlling Attitudes

Abstract

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will. I hope to show that believing could not be "voluntary," that is, one could not believe in the way one can perform an ordinary intentional action. You could not believe in the way that you can raise your right hand or look left or prepare dinner. Moreover, this is, as suspected by Bernard Williams, a conceptual matter, traceable in part (but only in part) to the relationship between belief and truth: beliefs "aim at truth" or "purport to represent reality." However, I also hope to show that, while there is a sense in which belief is not "voluntary," it is nonetheless subject to two quite robust forms of agency, and, further, that these two forms of agency are also exercised with respect to intention. In fact, we will see that the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well -even without the aim at truth. It will turn out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

Non-rational aspects of skilled agency

“…If you intend to do the dishes, you do thereby have a point of view concerning that practical question of what to do. (I find Hieronymi (2006) particularly helpful on this issue.) 7 A conscientious rationalist will allow that this sort of awareness is often present even when it is not occurrent in the individual's consciousness.…”

Salience Reasoning

“…They understand that they are capable of making mistakes and correcting them, and they can recognize these capacities in other like creatures. Thus, they are capable of evaluative control of their beliefs, desires, inferences and intentions (Hieronymi 2006); they are capable of recognizing a common point of view from which such assessments can be made (without which it would not be possible for them to distinguish between what is and what only seems to be correct); and they are capable of reflecting on the practical framework within which they formulate and assess the practical situations in which they find themselves. Resourceful reflective rational agents, like the sheikh's heirs, are capable of recognizing traps of their own practical reasoning and of finding ways to escape them.…”

Responsabilidad, Autoría Y Voluntad: La Propuesta De Moran

“…Siguiendo la terminología de Hieronymi (2006), ¿tiene el agente control evaluativo sobre sus razones? Si lo tuviera, el argumento de Moran parecería ser circular, como señala Moya (2006): no explica el conocimiento que tenemos sobre los propios estados mentales, sino que lo presupone.…”