Contempt and disgust: the emotions of disrespect

Abstract

Contempt and disgust share a number of features which distinguish them from other hostile emotions: they both present two distinct facets—a nonmoral facet and a moral one; they both imply a negative evaluation of the dispositional kind as well as disrespect towards the target of the feeling; and they trigger avoidance and exclusion action tendencies. However, while sharing a common core, contempt and disgust are in our view distinct emotions, qualified by different cognitive‐motivational features. Contempt is felt exclusively towards human targets, and implies sense of superiority over them, pessimistic feelings about their possibility of betterment, detachment from them, and avoidance driven by detachment; whereas disgust can be directed at a wide range of possible targets, and implies contamination sensitivity, fear of contamination, and fear‐driven avoidance. The differences between contempt and disgust are related to the different kinds of standard against which the target is evaluated, and the different kinds of disrespect engendered by the negative evaluation.

Broadening the Perspective on Emotional Contagion and Emotional Mimicry: The Correction Hypothesis

“…This idea is in line with results from studies demonstrating that when people are not provided with any explicit information, they trust complete strangers or naturally presume that others think the same way they do (Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). However, this explanation seems unlikely when a photographed or video-recorded sender expresses an intrinsically nonaffiliative emotion (e.g., anger or contempt; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2017). Here, the lack of accompanying explicit information may suggest that the sender’s intent is negative (e.g., the receiver may think that a frown or a sneer is directed at him or her), and thus no congruent reaction should occur.…”

Reprehensible, Laughable: The Role of Contempt in Negative Campaigning

“…Contempt, in which other people are regarded as beneath some standard (W. I. Miller, 1997), is related to but clearly distinguishable from disgust (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2018), in which objects or behaviors are considered substandard, and from shame, in which aspects of the self are seen as substandard (S. Miller, 1985; Roseman, 2013).…”

Validating the Radboud faces database from a child’s perspective

“…Gervais & Fessler, 2017). Like disgust, contempt is thought to be a "hostile emotion", however, underpinned by different cognitive-motivational components and social function (for a discussion on features of contempt see, Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2018). The RaFD is highly standardised (no glasses, make-up or facial hair), includes models with modern haircuts and neutral clothing compared to the Ekman-Friesen Pictures of Facial Affect, and takes eye-gaze and camera position into account.…”