Prior research has typically attempted to distinguish one emotion from another by identifying distinctive expressions, physiology, and subjective qualities. Recent theories claim emotions can also be differentiated by distinctive action tendencies, actions, and emotivational goals. To test hypotheses from both older and more recent theories, 100 Ss were asked to recall experiences of particular negative emotions and answer questions concerning what they felt, thought, felt like doing, actually did, and wanted. Results support hypotheses specifying characteristic responses for fear, sadness, distress, frustration, disgust, dislike, anger, regret, guilt, and shame. The findings indicate that discrete emotions have distinctive goals and action tendencies, as well as thoughts and feelings. In addition, they provide empirical support for hypothesized emotion states that have received insufficient attention from researchers.

This article reports 3 studies in which the authors examined (a) the distinctive characteristics of anger and contempt responses and (b) the interpersonal causes and effects of both emotions. In the 1st study, the authors examined the distinction between the 2 emotions; in the 2nd study, the authors tested whether contempt could be predicted from previous anger incidents with the same person; and in the 3rd study, the authors examined the effects of type of relationship on anger and contempt reactions. The results of the 3 studies show that anger and contempt often occur together but that there are clear distinctions between the 2 emotions: Anger is characterized more by short-term attack responses but long-term reconciliation, whereas contempt is characterized by rejection and social exclusion of the other person, both in the short-term and in the long-term. The authors also found that contempt may develop out of previously experienced anger and that a lack of intimacy with and perceived control over the behavior of the other person, as well as negative dispositional attributions about the other person, predicted the emergence of contempt.

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A recent theory (Roseman, 1979(Roseman, ,1984 attempts to specify the particular appraisals of events that elicit 16 discrete emotions. This study tested hypotheses from the latest version of the theory and compared them with hypotheses derived from appraisal theories proposed by Arnold (1960) and by Scherer (1988), using procedures designed to address some prior methodological problems. Results provided empirical support for numerous hypotheses linking particular appraisals of situational state (motive-inconsistent/motive-consistent), motivational state (punishment/reward), probability (uncertain/certain), power (weak/strong), legitimacy (negative outcome deserved/positive outcome deserved), and agency (circumstances/other person/self) to particular emotions. Where hypotheses were not supported, new appraisal-emotion relationships that revise the theory were proposed.Why do people feel particular discrete emotions, such as sadness, anger, or guilt? Why does a particular person in a particular situation (e.g., the breakup of a relationship) feel one of these emotions rather than another? Why do different people in the same situation, or the same person in a situation at different times, feel different emotions?Appraisal theorists (e.) claim that evaluations and interpretations of events, rather than events per se, determine whether an emotion will be felt and which emotion it will be. 1 Two individuals will feel the same emotion to the extent that their appraisals of a situation are the same. Two individuals with different appraisals, or the same individual with different appraisals at different times, will feel different emotions. Thus, by identifying emotion-causing patterns of appraisal, such theories may be able to explain how an infinite variety of situations can elicit the same emotion and may also be able to explain the apparent variability across people and over time in emotional responses to the same event. The challenge for appraisal theorists is to specify the patterns of appraisal that can produce particular emotions. In the present generation of appraisal theories, RosemanWe are grateful to , and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on drafts of this article; and to lisa Rettek and Nancy Nichols for their support. have related patterns of appraisal to particular emotions, without necessarily claiming that the appraisals cause the emotions. 899

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Which are the appraisals that contribute to determining whether emotions will occur and which emotions will occur? Is the universe of appraisals and emotions a haphazard collection, all equally important, thrown together in infinite and arbitrary permutations by accidents of experience? Or is there some underlying organization and coherence?This article discusses what I will refer to as the Emotion System model. It shows how conceptualizing emotions as an organized system of coping responses, and identifying the specifics of that system, can help us understand why humans have the particular emotions that researchers have identified, why these emotions are aroused and differentiated as specified in appraisal theories, and why they vary as they do. Updating earlier versions of the model (Roseman, 1984(Roseman, , 2001, I consider what can be learned from coherence (a) within emotion syndromes; (b) among emotion syndromes; (c) between appraisal combinations and emotions; and (d) between motivations and emotions. I then discuss implications of this perspective for debates about the dimensional vs. categorical nature of appraisal and emotion, about emotion variability, and about the number of distinct emotions.Emotions are syndromes composed of several response components (Roseman, 1984; cf. Scherer, 1984): phenomenological (thoughts and feelings characteristic of the emotion); physiological Abstract Emotions can be understood as a coherent, integrated system of general-purpose coping strategies, guided by appraisal, for responding to situations of crisis and opportunity (when specific-purpose motivational systems may be less effective). This perspective offers functional explanations for the presence of particular emotions in the emotion repertoire, and their elicitation by particular appraisal combinations. Implications of the Emotion System model for debated issues, such as the dimensional vs. discrete nature of appraisals and emotions, are also discussed.Author note: I am grateful to Agnes Moors and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful questions, insightful comments, and helpful suggestions.

Researchers have found undeniable variability and irrefutable evidence of consistencies in emotional responses across situations, individuals, and cultures. Both must be acknowledged in constructing adequate, enduring models of emotional phenomena. In this article I outline an empirically-grounded model of the structure of the emotion system, in which relatively variable actions may be used to pursue relatively consistent goals within discrete emotion syndromes; the syndromes form a stable, coherent set of strategies for coping with crises and opportunities. I also discuss a framework that can integrate dimensional and discrete perspectives on emotions.

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