Constrained Citizens? Ideological Structure and Conflict Extension in the US Electorate, 1980–2016

Hare, Christopher

doi:10.1017/s000712342100051x

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 88 publications

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“…We refer to the first type of individuals as Downsians because of their relationship to the voters described in Downs (1957). These individuals have preferences across policy questions that are well approximated by an ideal point on an underlying liberal–conservative ideological dimension (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010; Hare 2021; Jessee 2012; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013). We anticipate that there will be many liberal and conservative Downsians.…”

Section: Data and Measurement Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderates

et al. 2022

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Moderates are often overlooked in contemporary research on American voters. Many scholars who have examined moderates argue that these individuals are only classified as such due to a lack of political sophistication or conflicted views across issues. We develop a method to distinguish three ways an individual might be classified as moderate: having genuinely moderate views across issues, being inattentive to politics or political surveys, or holding views poorly summarized by a single liberal–conservative dimension. We find that a single ideological dimension accurately describes most, but not all, Americans’ policy views. Using the classifications from our model, we demonstrate that moderates and those whose views are not well explained by a single dimension are especially consequential for electoral selection and accountability. These results suggest a need for renewed attention to the middle of the American political spectrum.

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Section: Data and Measurement Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderates

et al. 2022

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“…Current research indicates that partisan animosity is rooted in substantive disagreements (Orr and Huber 2020;Dias and Lelkes 2022). Ideological conflict represents a significant discrepancy between comprehensive narratives, leading to extended troubling conflicts (Layman and Carsey 2002;Hare 2022).…”

Section: Ideological Alignment Among Partisansmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, the ideological rifts in the US public have deepened, making it challenging to bridge or reconcile the two comprehensive albeit radically opposing narratives (Levendusky 2010b;Mason 2015;Abramowitz 2022;Hare 2022). A troubling consequence of this rise in ideological alignment is the increasing animosity between different partisan camps, known as affective polarization (Homola et al 2023).…”

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confidence: 99%

No Conservative View Left

Cely

2024

Preprint

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This study delves into the ideological alignment of partisans, a phenomenon of some beneficial and multiple troubling consequences within European political landscapes. I hypothesize a substantial asymmetry in ideological alignment between partisans on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, with profound implications for our understanding of political polarization and party strategies across Europe. Utilizing conventional methods and innovative belief network modeling, I analyze data from the fourth and eighth waves of the European Social Survey (2008, 2016), supplemented by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Manifesto Project, covering 15 European countries, 131 political parties, and 23,586 partisans, to test this hypothesis. My findings reveal that supporters of new left parties exhibit a more consistent and coherent set of beliefs compared to their right-wing counterparts. However, the study also uncovers the limits of this asymmetry in a significant shift in ideological alignment on sociocultural issues on the right, indicating the emergence of a deeper, broader ideological conflict. Furthermore, my analysis demonstrates the limited impact of strategies like position blurring and programmatic nicheness, showing only a small effect on ideological alignment in economic matters. These insights highlight the propensity of new left supporters for some worrisome consequences of high belief homogeneity, such as echo chambers and lack of cross-cutting ties, and stress the pivotal role of both the new left and the radical right in the ideological conflict across Europe.

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“…social and economic), and social ideas and policies have ramifications for the economic domain and vice versa. Recently, Hare (2022) demonstrated that the social and economic dimensions of ideology in the US have become increasingly intertwined over the past four decades and that opinions on policy controversies about economic, social and racial issues better fit a unidimensional ideological structure in the US. Similarly, Stoetzer and Zittlau (2020) found that in US presidential elections, voters' attitudes about social and economic policies have become almost non‐separable and collapse into a single dimension.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationally blind? Rationality polarizes policy support for colour blindness versus multiculturalism

keersmaecker

Schmid

Roets

et al. 2023

British J Social Psychol

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Do White Americans prefer society to be ‘colour‐blind’ by rising above racial identities, or ‘multicultural’ by openly discussing and considering them? We developed an ideology‐rationality model to understand support for these diversity perspectives. Specifically, since people endorse a diversity perspective in line with their ideological values, we hypothesized that conservatism is related to a relative preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism. However, since colour blindness and multiculturalism are complex and multi‐layered ideologies, we further hypothesized that the relationship between conservatism and a preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism is especially pronounced under higher levels of rationality. Results confirmed the hypotheses, either when rationality was operationalized within a dual process theory (Study 1, N = 496) or experimentally induced within a tripartite model of cognition (Study 2, N = 497). Higher levels of rationality guided White Americans high in conservatism towards a stronger preference for colour‐blindness, but those low in conservatism towards a stronger preference for multiculturalism. These results suggest that among White Americans the endorsement of colour blindness versus multiculturalism stems from the interplay between ideological orientation and rationality and that rational considerations about racial policies may further divide rather than unify along ideological lines.

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Constrained Citizens? Ideological Structure and Conflict Extension in the US Electorate, 1980–2016

Cited by 7 publications

References 88 publications

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No Conservative View Left

Rationally blind? Rationality polarizes policy support for colour blindness versus multiculturalism

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