Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism

Abstract

Constitutional interpretation is problematic because it can be difficult to distinguish legitimate interpretation from illegitimate change. The distinction depends largely on what a constitution is. A constitution, like any other law, necessarily has a meaning, which pre-exists judicial interpretation: it is not a set of meaningless marks on paper. Any plausible constitutional theory must offer an account of the nature of that meaning. In doing so, it must address two main questions. The first is whether the meaning of the constitution is given solely by its words, or also by additional evidence of underlying intentions, purposes or values. The second question is whether, in either case, its meaning is determined by the original meanings, intentions, purposes or values of the founding generation, or by contemporary meanings, intentions, purposes or values. This question divides so-called 'originalists' from 'non-originalists'. This article discusses all these alternatives, and the main arguments for and against them. It is subtitled 'Originalism' because it defends a moderate version of that position; however, it is argued that this is equivalent to a moderate version of non-originalism.

Constitutional Interpretation: Non‐originalism

“…This is the central thesis that self‐professed originalists maintain and that non‐originalists deny. As Jeffrey Goldsworthy wrote in a recent article on originalism published in this journal, originalists ‘insist that, unless it has been formally amended, the constitution continues to mean today what it meant when it was first enacted or adopted’ (Goldsworthy 683). Crucially, the relevant ‘meaning’ is not merely what some theorists describe as ‘semantic’ or ‘linguistic’.…”

Interpretação e autoridade do direito na obra Joseph Raz

“…Dez. 2022 Introdução "A prática jurídica", escreveu Ronald Dworkin (1985,146), "é um exercício de interpretação". A frase não é um exagero.…”

O neoconstitucionalismo e o fim do estado de direito

“…Em primeiro lugar, revela-se relevante a advertência de Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2003) no sentido de que não se deve superestimar a ideia de transformação por meio de uma interpretação constitucional inovadora, seja porque raramente ocorrem mudanças paradigmáticas em razão de decisões judiciais ou porque essa perspectiva não descreve com fidelidade o trabalho interpretativo dos juízes. De acordo com o autor, os advogados dificilmente utilizam a linguagem de mudança em suas alegações, sendo também muito improvável que um magistrado aja conscientemente com a intenção de alterar os compromissos democraticamente assumidos.…”