Constituency, Ideology, and Economic Interests in U.S. Congressional Voting

Abstract

Scholarly studies of U.S. legislators’ voting behavior have concluded that constituent interests exercise only limited influence, but these conclusions may result from inadequate measurement. I develop new measures of economic interests that emphasize import/export (sectoral) cleavages in addition to business/labor (factoral) cleavages and, in the process, transcend geographic boundaries. Results of logistic regression analysis suggest that the interests of economic and nongeographic constituencies, as reflected in campaign contributions, were highly significant predictors of voting in the U.S. Congress on the U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement and that the import/export cleavage was more salient than the business/labor cleavage. In addition, legislators’ ideological positions with respect to national security were more significant than their partisan affiliations and more significant than their positions on other dimensions of ideology.

Rethinking political competition: Contracts and nationally located linkages in Colombian municipalities (1988–2015)

“…We use different proxies to measure these variables, including measuring NNLs using Colombian Senate votes at the municipal level. We draw on the extensive literature on intermediation by members of Congress between the local government and the national government (Ames, 1995; Bawn, 1995; Choi, 2015; Duque, 2011). Our analysis uses the Herfindahl and Hirschman index (HHI) for Senate elections at the municipal level as a proxy to measure the number of NNLs.…”

Do Lawmakers Respond to Crisis Ideologically or Pragmatically?

“…Most research on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship focuses on lawmakers’ issue priorities rather than the policy instruments in the bills they support. Issue agendas are explained by lawmakers’ personal backgrounds and interests (Burden, 2007; Carnes, 2013; Choi, 2015; Swers, 2020; Tate, 2004), partisanship (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al, 2003), interest groups (Gelman, 2017; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Rocca & Gordon, 2010), the president’s agenda if they are of the same party (Hall, 1998; Kingdon, 1989), and perceptions of constituency needs (Hall, 1998; Hayes et al, 2010; Miler, 2010; Sulkin, 2005). which can be revealed by challengers’ campaigns (Hall, 1998; Miler, 2010; Sulkin, 2005, 2011), and protests (Gause, 2020).…”

The politics of beer: analysis of the congressional votes on the beer bill of 1933

“…Typically, these studies have addressed the voting decisions by individual members of the US House, the Senate, or both chambers. One major strand of this research specifically has assessed the determinants of votes on US trade bills (Tosini and Tower 1987;Baldwin 1985;Baldwin and Magee 1985;Choi 2015;Weller 2009;Marks 1993;Kahane 1996;Stegall and Jennings 1996). Each of these studies has addressed various factors that may be especially relevant to an individual legislator's support, including national party affiliation, constituent preferences, personal ideology, and special interest effects.…”

“…However, empirical results typically find either no-or at best a weak-impact on legislative decision making. Nevertheless, such findings may be explained by the ways in which voter and constituency preferences are measured (Choi 2015). On the other hand, most research in this vein indicates that particular special interest pressure plays an extremely important role in determining legislative voting behavior on trade legislation (Baldwin and Magee 1998;Coughlin 1985;Tosini and Tower 1987;Steagall and Jennings 1996) and more generally (Olson 1965;Tullock 1989).…”