Consociation in the Present

Abstract

Consociation, one type of power‐sharing, is perhaps the least appreciated. This article reviews and replies to a collection celebrating Arend Lijphart’s pioneering article on consociational democracy published in 1969. The consociational perspective retains its interpretive power, including in the examination of major polities, such as the European Union, the Indian Union, and the USA. In the classical cases, consociational persistence in Belgium and Switzerland contrasts with decay or dissolution in Austria and the Netherlands. Whether the Good Friday Agreement over Northern Ireland demonstrates that consociation rewards ethnic extremism remains unproven. Far from being an exhausted research program, the consociational theme remains vibrant within comparative political analysis, and in the repertoire for managing deeply divided places. No one has ever claimed that consociation is a panacea for national, ethnic, religious or linguistic conflict. Yet the principles of parity, proportionality, autonomy, and minority veto‐rights remain cogent in analysis and political prescription.

From Dayton to Bernese Jura: The Election of the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…Consociationalists reject these critics, by answering that consociation seeks “to incentivize the more moderate among the hardliners, in order to negotiate and maintain power‐sharing” (O'Leary, 2019: 558). Regarding the critics on the consociational demo(i)cracy, one is reminded of Lijphart's (1977) vague concept of the “segments” which could forge a “common demos” (a term that Lijphart had not used), or of the liberal version of consociation that “could solve the antinomy between consociation and democracy” (Stojanović, 2020: 39).…”

“…Two main theoretical power‐sharing approaches, consociationalism and centripetalism, try to offer innovative solutions to heal resentments based upon ethnic, religious, linguistic and other cleavages in deeply divided societies, with the aim to stabilize democracies and accommodate the groups formed on those divisions. For decades, the two approaches have been seen as two distinct schools of thought that do not need to “intellectually accommodate one another” (O'Leary, 2019: 559) and that promote political stability in states composed of rival communities. Scholars question how the various electoral mechanisms of each of the two approaches could contribute to making deeply divided societies functional and eliminating grievances that exist when certain groups do not feel adequately represented in joint institutions.…”

Comparative Perspectives

“…If the dominant cultural majority is large enough, it will not have to take into account the preferences of the minority (e.g. O’Leary 2019 , 558).…”

Consensus Democracy: The Swiss System of Power-Sharing

“…None of its elements—with the exception of one or two partisan seats on the Federal Council—have ever been seriously put into question (cf. also Vatter 2016 , 72; O’Leary 2019 , 570).…”