The ethnic outbidding thesis predicts centrifugal polarisation in ethnically divided party systems. We argue instead that the incentives of power‐sharing institutions can encourage the development of electoral strategies based on ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ in which parties combine robust ethnic identity representation with increased pragmatism over resource allocation. We test these arguments in Northern Ireland and show that though evidence of direct vote switching from moderate parties to ostensibly ‘extreme’ parties is prima facie consistent with the outbidding thesis, attitudinal convergence between the nationalist and unionist communities on the main political issues is not. The recent electoral success of the DUP and Sinn Féin can instead be explained by these parties' ‘ethnic tribune’ appeals. Many voters simultaneously endorse peace, prosperity and (increasingly) power sharing but also want the strongest voice to protect their ethnonational interests. Identity voting for ethnic tribune parties implies a degree of resolve in advocating ethnic group interests, but does not entail the increased polarisation implied by outbidding models. Like their voters, ethnic tribune parties can be simultaneously pragmatic (with regard to resources) and intransigent (with regard to identity), so that despite appearances to the contrary, the power‐sharing institutions in Northern Ireland incentivise centripetal dynamics that inhibit outbidding.

No abstract

In the first of two articles the authors show what consociational theory may learn from the case of Northern Ireland, namely, the importance of external agencies in making and implementing consociational settlements, the relations between consociational and self‐determination settlements, the ‘complexity’ of internal settlements, the merits of STV (PR) in electoral arrangements, innovations in using proportional representation decision rules to allocate ministerial portfolios, and conceptual modifications. A second article addresses what anti‐consociationalists may learn from the same case.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first shows what consociationalists can learn from Northern Ireland. The second shows what critics of consociational theory can learn from Northern Ireland. The authors argue that a revised consociational theory provides the most sensible basis for understanding and prescribing for Northern Ireland and similar conflict zones. The third section suggests a number of ways in which Northern Ireland's Agreement may be best stabilised following the uncertainty of the first phase in efforts to implement it (1998-2003)

No abstract