Considering Consumers’ Green Preferences and Government Subsidies in the Decision Making of the Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Supply Chain: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Abstract

Resource utilization of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is regarded to be an important means of achieving the sustainable development of the economy and the environment. However, previous research has not fully considered the green degree of products in the demand function of CDW remanufactured products. This study aimed to clarify how consumers’ green preferences and government subsidies affect decision making in the supply chain. First, a CDW resource utilization supply chain model composed of building materials manufacturers and retailers was constructed using consumer behavior theory. Second, the optimal decision making of members under conditions of decentralized and centralized decision making was analyzed using the Stackelberg game solution. Finally, the validity of the model and conclusions were verified by numerical simulation. The main conclusions are as follows. Government subsidies have a different impact on the pricing of new building materials products and CDW remanufactured products. Under decentralized decision making, the optimal profit of the CDW resource utilization supply chain with government subsidies is higher. However, under centralized decision making, the optimal profit is also related to consumers’ green preferences. According to consumers’ green preferences, choosing different decision-making models can not only improve the total profit of the CDW resource utilization supply chain, but also improve the reuse rate of CDW.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Technology Innovation Behaviour for Enterprises from the Perspective of Prospect Theory

“…An increase in the subjective portion coefficient indicates that enterprises remain optimistic about the green technology market, and the optimistic one will have a higher incentive to innovate green technology [30]. It is also in line with Han et al's research that the optimal profitability of building material manufacturers and retailers is increasing as consumers' green preferences increase [31]. e subjective spill coefficient as a loss has a reverse disincentive effect on enterprises' green technology innovation behaviour.…”

“…Consumers' green preferences also can promote the development of green industries [31,32]. More importantly, enterprises differ in entrepreneurial abilities, risk preference, or initial endowment.…”

Decision‐Making Mechanism of Cooperative Innovation between Clients and Service Providers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

“…eory. Being different classical game theory, which assumes that the participants are all completely rational [20][21][22], evolutionary game theory focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change [23]. In the evolutionary game process, participants are bounded rationally and dynamically adjust their strategies based on observing and learning other participants' strategy [24].…”

Incentive Regulation of Construction Waste Resource Recycling: Subsidy and Tax Incentive

“…Yang et al [32] established a decision-making model including the government, construction waste recycling enterprises, and consumers and optimized the construction waste resource utilization system by adjusting the factors infuencing environmental benefts. Han et al [37] clarifed how consumers' green preferences and government subsidies afect decision-making in the supply chain. All the above scholars studied the construction waste problem through the Stackelberg game because the government is in an absolute leader position in the policy formulation of construction waste resource utilization.…”

“…(1) According to (37), the proft of traditional building materials enterprises under subsidy incentive regulation π S * n is lower than that under no regulation π N * n , while the proft π S * r of construction waste recycling enterprise under subsidy incentive regulation is higher than that under no regulation π N * r , which means that after the government implements subsidy incentive regulations, the profts of traditional building materials enterprises will decline, while the profts of construction waste recycling enterprise will rise. Tis shows that the subsidy incentive regulation has an incentive efect on construction waste recycling enterprise but has a restraining efect on traditional building materials enterprise.…”