Incentive Regulation of Construction Waste Resource Recycling: Subsidy and Tax Incentive

Abstract

Construction waste destroys the sustainability of environment and economy. In the study of game theory at present, the construction waste resource-based products supply chain only considers that there is only one type of enterprise producing renewable building materials or new building materials in the market, but in the construction market, there is no single type of enterprise. It isvery important for government to protect the environment and promote the resource utilization and development of construction waste. Therefore, this study establishes a game theory model between traditional building materials enterprise and construction waste recycling enterprise, which considers the decision-making behavior of enterprise under no regulation, subsidy incentive regulation, or tax incentive regulation. The findings are listed as follows: (1) both subsidies and tax incentives can effectively improve the economic benefits and production initiative of construction waste recycling enterprise. (2) The impact coefficient of unit new building materials on the environment and the tax rate of unit new building materials are the key factors that affect government decision-making. (3) Resource utilization cost coefficient and builder’s preference for renewable building materials have a great impact on the profits of construction waste recycling enterprise. These results will provide reference for the government to formulate incentive regulations and promote the development of construction waste resources.