Resource utilization of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is regarded to be an important means of achieving the sustainable development of the economy and the environment. However, previous research has not fully considered the green degree of products in the demand function of CDW remanufactured products. This study aimed to clarify how consumers’ green preferences and government subsidies affect decision making in the supply chain. First, a CDW resource utilization supply chain model composed of building materials manufacturers and retailers was constructed using consumer behavior theory. Second, the optimal decision making of members under conditions of decentralized and centralized decision making was analyzed using the Stackelberg game solution. Finally, the validity of the model and conclusions were verified by numerical simulation. The main conclusions are as follows. Government subsidies have a different impact on the pricing of new building materials products and CDW remanufactured products. Under decentralized decision making, the optimal profit of the CDW resource utilization supply chain with government subsidies is higher. However, under centralized decision making, the optimal profit is also related to consumers’ green preferences. According to consumers’ green preferences, choosing different decision-making models can not only improve the total profit of the CDW resource utilization supply chain, but also improve the reuse rate of CDW.

In recent years, the generation of a large amount of construction and demolition waste (CDW) has threatened the public environment and human health. The inefficient supply chain of CDW resource utilization hinders the green development of countries around the world, including China. This study aims to reveal the impact of information sharing regarding recyclers’ market demand forecast on the performance of CDW resource utilization supply chains. Therefore, this paper uses the incomplete information dynamic game method to establish and solve the decision-making model of the construction and demolition waste resource utilization supply chain under the conditions of recyclers sharing and not sharing their information. The paper then obtains the Bayesian equilibrium solution and the optimal expected profit for each party. Finally, a numerical simulation was used in order to verify the validity of the model and conclusions. The main conclusions are as follows. In the CDW resource utilization supply chain, if the recycler is more pessimistic about the market’s demand forecast, their information sharing makes the remanufacturer more motivated to improve their level of environmental responsibility. In addition, information sharing by recyclers is always beneficial in increasing the profit of the remanufacturer, but it also may make the recycler lose profit. When the efficiency of the environmental responsibility investment of remanufacturers is in a high range, information sharing increases the profits of recyclers. Conversely, information sharing has no significant effect on the profits of recyclers. The impact on the profits of the entire CDW resource utilization supply chain depends on the intensity of competition among channels, the market share of offline recycling channels and the efficiency of environmental responsibility investments.

Research in the field of project management has focused on recycling construction and demolition waste (CDW). However, the problem of how to compensate for the performance of CDW recycling public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operation period has not been resolved. This paper aims to reveal the compensation mechanism during the operation period of CDW recycling PPP projects considering the two-stage performance of recycling and remanufacturing. This paper takes CDW recycling PPP projects as the research object and uses the Stackelberg game and principal-agent theory to establish and solve the master-slave game decision model of CDW recycling PPP projects. The main conclusions are as follows. When social welfare is maximized, the performance compensation coefficients in the recycling and remanufacturing stages are the same and have homogeneity. In addition, the compensation policy positively promotes the two-stage performance, social capital profit and social welfare of the recycling and remanufacturing of CDW recycling PPP projects. This paper not only broadens the application knowledge system of the relevant knowledge of project management in the field of CDW recycling but also provides new evidence for principal-agent theory from the operation stage of CDW recycling PPP projects.