Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

Abstract

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. AbstractWe use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.

Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

“…Based on different methods several studies (Andreoni, 1995;Houser and Kurzban, 2002;Ferraro and Vossler, 2010;Bayer et al, 2013) have established that some subjects lack a basic understanding of how their choices, together with the choices of other group members, affect experimental payoffs for themselves and for their group. Hence, in absence of an appropriate control condition it would be unclear, how to interpret a link between cognitive abilities and contributions observed in the baseline.…”

“…The first treatment condition addresses the concern that some subjects in public good games could be confused about the true incentive structure (Andreoni, 1995;Houser and Kurzban, 2002;Ferraro and Vossler, 2010;Bayer et al, 2013). For such confused subjects contributions cannot simply be equated with cooperation.…”

Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games

“…This hypothesis consequently predicts a decline in cooperation over time as individuals learn, albeit imperfectly, how behaviour influences payoffs. Consistent with this alternative hypothesis, individuals have been found to contribute similar amounts over time to the group project even when they do not know they are playing the public goods game with others [23,27]. However, this alternate hypothesis has been argued against, with the suggestion that the decline in cooperation is better explained by pro-social individuals conditionally cooperating depending upon the behaviour of others, rather than individuals learning how to better play the game [21].…”

Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange

“…Avenues for further research include multilateral bargaining experiments in the laboratory, building on the classic bargaining experiments by Tietz and Weber and on more recent non-bargaining experiments in low-information environments such as Bayer et al (2013), Nax et al (2013), Burton-Chellew et al (2015). We are particularly interested in the speed with which convergence occurs, and the conditions under which such simple directional bargaining dynamics apply.…”