Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

Lohse, Johannes

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2531634

Cited by 20 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(42 reference statements)

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“…On the one hand our rejection of the FII hypothesis is in line with a number of recent papers (Fiedler et al, 2013;Tinghög et al, 2013;Martinsson et al, 2014;Duffy and Smith, 2014;Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014;Achtziger et al, 2015;Kocher et al, 2016;Lohse, 2016;Capraro and Cococcioni, 2016;Tinghög et al, 2016) and a large scale replication project (Bouwmeester et al, 2017) which also suggest that in some instances behaving fairly might not be intuitive and might even require additional deliberation or stronger self-control. On the other hand, our results are surprising at least to the degree that they contradict a significant number of previous studies which tend to find that time pressure or other forms of inducing intuitive decision making lead to more cooperative or fair choices.…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

“…Furthermore, Tinghög et al (2016) find that time pressure does not affect the fraction of fair choices in (modified) dictator games. Finally, findings in Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) and Lohse (2016) suggest that placing subjects under stronger time pressure leads to more selfish choices in public good games. Similarly, Mrkva (2017) finds that time pressure leads to an increase of selfish choices in modified dictator games with high stakes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

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Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Merkel¹,

Lohse

2018

Exp Econ

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Evidence from response time studies and time pressure experiments has led several authors to conclude that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting findings we provide theoretical arguments showing under which conditions an increase in "fairness" due to time pressure indeed provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects decisions under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person binary dictator and prisoner's dilemma games under time pressure or time delay. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option. Our main finding is that time pressure does not consistently promote fairness in situations where this would be predicted after accounting for choice difficulty. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive".

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Section: Conclusion and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Merkel¹,

Lohse

2018

Exp Econ

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“…According to Kohlberg’s rationalism 29 30 31 32 , abstract ethical principles are applied only at the third, post-conventional , level of reasoning, requiring a high amount of cognitive resources. In line with this view, a recent experiment has shown that time pressure decreases cooperation among subjects with high cognitive abilities 34 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 77%

Rethinking spontaneous giving: Extreme time pressure and ego-depletion favor self-regarding reactions

Capraro

Cococcioni

2016

Sci Rep

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Previous experimental studies suggest that cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is, on average, spontaneous, rather than calculative. To explain this finding, it has been proposed that people internalize cooperative heuristics in their everyday life and bring them as intuitive strategies in new and atypical situations. Yet, these studies have important limitations, as they promote intuitive responses using weak time pressure or conceptual priming of intuition. Since these manipulations do not deplete participants’ ability to reason completely, it remains unclear whether cooperative heuristics are really automatic or they emerge after a small, but positive, amount of deliberation. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, we report two experiments demonstrating that spontaneous reactions in one-shot anonymous interactions tend to be egoistic. In doing so, our findings shed further light on the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation, as they suggest that cooperation in one-shot interactions is not automatic, but appears only at later stages of reasoning.

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“…Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014), Strømland, Tjotta and Torsvik (2016) and Lohse (2016) all found no overall effect of time pressure on cooperation; if anything, Lohse (2016) found that time pressure decreases cooperation, but only among subjects who score high in the CRT. Rand et al (2012).…”

Section: Review Of the Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 98%

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

Capraro¹

2019

Preprint

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Which social decisions are intuitive? Which are deliberative? The dual-process approach to human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. Here, I review the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, positive and negative reciprocity, and (act) utilitarianism. I conclude by introducing a game-theoretical framework that organizes the majority of the empirical regularities. This framework extends Rand and colleagues’ Social Heuristics Hypothesis to any one-shot game G. The core assumption of this “General Social Heuristics Hypothesis” is that, under intuition, people play a Nash equilibrium of the “real analogue of G”, G^real, while under deliberation people play a Nash equilibrium of G. G^real differs from G along two dimensions: G is one-shot, while G^real might be iterated; the payoffs of G^real might be different from the payoffs of G, although they are ordered in (almost) the same way.

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Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

Cited by 20 publications

References 40 publications

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Rethinking spontaneous giving: Extreme time pressure and ego-depletion favor self-regarding reactions

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

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