Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?

Zuleta, Hernando; Villaveces, Marta Juanita; Andonova, Veneta

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.09.003

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Nonetheless, in November 2016, in culmination of over three years of negotiations, GoC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement. This process was facilitated by various countries , including the governments of Norway, Venezuela and Cuba (Zuleta et al, 2013). In parallel to this process, the GoC was developing its National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD), which is intended to contribute to climate change mitigation via forest conservation and development activities.…”

Section: The Study Sitementioning

confidence: 99%

Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas affected by armed-conflict

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas affected by armed-conflict The International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) believes that open access contributes to its mission of reducing hunger and poverty, and improving human nutrition in the tropics through research aimed at increasing the eco-efficiency of agriculture. CIAT is committed to creating and sharing knowledge and information openly and globally. We do this through collaborative research as well as through the open sharing of our data, tools, and publications.

show abstract

Section: The Study Sitementioning

confidence: 99%

Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas affected by armed-conflict

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This analysis is left for future research. 3 Other contributions in the area of negotiations are Chang (2008) and Zuleta, Villaveces, and Andonova (2013).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions

Zambrano

Zuleta

2017

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:We model the strategy of an insurgent group that follows a pattern of prolonged popular war but negotiates with the government. The main results of the model are the following: (i) If the marginal probability of signing a peace treaty is significantly low when the guerrilla invests little on non-violent strategies, then they will continue to fight and allocate all its resources on military power. (ii) Ceteris paribus, the future stock of military power of a guerrilla is increasing in their current military power and its budget. (iii) The greater the government's military power, the lower the share of resources guerrillas allocate to violent strategies. We also provide two examples of negotiation processes between the Colombian government and FARC, and relate it to our theoretical results.

show abstract

“…This research generally models solutions in terms of classical games comparing the economic benefits/costs of maintaining the conflict versus reaching an agreement (Gorbaneff & Jacome, 2000; Zambrano & Zuleta, 2017). Other articles have examined the circumstances under which Colombian society can continue to survive the conflict and its costs, and the determinants of the transfer that would be required to reach an agreement (Salazar & Castillo, 2001; Zuleta, Villaveces & Andonova, 2013). Although these models describe various characteristics of the conflict, they neither account formally for the polarized environment nor consider the latter’s crucial role in the failure of previous peacemaking efforts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining under polarization: The case of the Colombian armed conflict

Laengle

Loyola

Tobón-Orozco

2020

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A bargaining framework and a measure of conflict polarization are developed from two elements: (i) hatred-based negative externalities experienced by the parties to the conflict, and (ii) penalties the parties impose on their delegated negotiators when concessions are made in the bargaining process. The framework establishes agreement and disagreement regions and it is shown that a necessary condition for a negotiated solution is the adoption of a dual policy that combines dissociative political and military strategies. This analytical approach is applied first to polarized conflicts generally and then to the specific case of the internal conflict in Colombia between that country’s government and the FARC guerrilla group. The model provides a rationale for the complex dynamic of Colombia’s current peace process, which has involved a preliminary agreement and its subsequent rejection in a national referendum. Our analysis highlights the successful dissociative political-military strategy followed by the negotiators that enabled them to reach the agreement and the negotiators’ underestimation of the hatred levels that led the majority of the Colombian society represented in the referendum to vote the agreement down because they considered the concessions made by the government too generous to be acceptable.

show abstract

Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?

Cited by 5 publications

References 37 publications

Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas affected by armed-conflict

Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas affected by armed-conflict

Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions

Bargaining under polarization: The case of the Colombian armed conflict

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About