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This paper analyzes the main advances in health coverage and health services demand in IntroducciónEl primero de enero de 1995 entró en vigencia en Colombia una profunda reforma del sistema de seguridad social en salud (que había sido aprobada por ley en 1993), la cual pretendía el aseguramiento universal en salud con eficiencia, calidad y acceso a los servicios de salud. Establecía dos regímenes de aseguramiento: uno contributivo para quienes tienen un empleo formal o la forma de pagar y uno subsidiado para los pobres.La última información disponible sobre cobertura del aseguramiento antes de dicha reforma nos informa que durante el período 1986-1989 existe una cobertura de la seguridad social en salud del 23,8%, que sumada a la de otros tipos de seguros alcanzaba al 30,4% de la población 1 .

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This paper studies a principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal delegates to a risk-neutral agent the decision of whether to pursue a risky project or a safe one. The return from the risky project is unknown and the agent can acquire costly unobservable information about it before taking the decision. The problem has features of moral hazard and hidden information since the acquisition of information and its content is unobservable to the principal. The optimal contract suggests that the principal should only reward the agent for outcomes that are significantly better than the safe return. It is also optimal to distort the project choice in favor of the risky one as a mechanism to induce the direct revelation of the uncertain state. In a managerial context, the findings explain why options induce better decision-making from CEOs, as well as why excessive risk taking might be optimal.

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Abstract:We model the strategy of an insurgent group that follows a pattern of prolonged popular war but negotiates with the government. The main results of the model are the following: (i) If the marginal probability of signing a peace treaty is significantly low when the guerrilla invests little on non-violent strategies, then they will continue to fight and allocate all its resources on military power. (ii) Ceteris paribus, the future stock of military power of a guerrilla is increasing in their current military power and its budget. (iii) The greater the government's military power, the lower the share of resources guerrillas allocate to violent strategies. We also provide two examples of negotiation processes between the Colombian government and FARC, and relate it to our theoretical results.

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