2015
DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2014.962976
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Conditional Deterrence and Missile Defense

Abstract: The traditional view of ballistic missile defense is that defensive weapons are destabilizing. This article explains why the more broadly and traditionally accepted classical approach to deterrence is flawed and demonstrates the greater explanatory power and implications of conditional deterrence based on power parity theory. Given the implications that can be drawn from conditional deterrence, this article demonstrates that limited efforts at developing and deploying missile defenses enhance deterrence and re… Show more

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“…According to classical deterrence, the addition of missile defense systems generates potential instability by undermining opponents’ retaliatory capabilities. In reality, policymakers have exhibited a general discomfort with classical deterrence theory’s deduction that MAD ensures stability since the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (Gibilterra, 2015). Clearly, the fact that the United States seeks to achieve a nuclear advantage rather than preserve MAD challenges the validity of classical deterrence theory.…”
Section: Status Of the Fieldmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…According to classical deterrence, the addition of missile defense systems generates potential instability by undermining opponents’ retaliatory capabilities. In reality, policymakers have exhibited a general discomfort with classical deterrence theory’s deduction that MAD ensures stability since the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (Gibilterra, 2015). Clearly, the fact that the United States seeks to achieve a nuclear advantage rather than preserve MAD challenges the validity of classical deterrence theory.…”
Section: Status Of the Fieldmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recall that power transition theory suggests nuclear preponderance by the satisfied defender is the key to deterrence stability. Given the availability and affordability of a missile defense system, it is possible to strategically fortify power preponderance by dramatically reducing the ability of the potential challenger to inflict damage on the defender (Gibilterra, 2015; Quackenbush and Drury, 2011). This implication, however, does not generalize to the challenger side, because the dissatisfied challenger could use its defensive capabilities to advance its goals to overturn the status quo.…”
Section: Power Transition Deterrence and East Asiamentioning
confidence: 99%
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