Compositionality, iconicity, and perceptual nonconceptualism

Abstract

This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state-content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ''state-content error error,'' i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception.

The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences

“…Iconic representations are perhaps the clearest example. Operations like mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler 1971) and scanning (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser 1978) are inexplicable without appeal to structured representations, but at least some of those representations seem to have an iconic, rather than LoTlike, representational format (Kosslyn 1980;Fodor 2007;Carey 2009;Toribio 2011;Quilty-Dunn 2020b;cf. Pylyshyn 2002).…”

Concepts and predication from perception to cognition

“…Meanwhile, in adults, mental imagery and related phenomena implicate iconic rather than conceptual/propositional formats (Carey, 2009; Fodor, 2007; Quilty‐Dunn, 2019a). A growing contingent of theorists thus regard perception as a natural kind marked by its proprietary nonconceptual representations (Burge, 2014; Burnston, 2017a; Carey, 2009; Kulvicki, 2015a; Toribio, 2011; Block, ms; see also Evans (1982); Hopp (2011); Peacocke (2001) for other nonconceptualist arguments).…”

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

“…Burge (2010a) offers other arguments for non-propositional content in perception, hinging largely on the fact that perceptual capacities don't require capacities for rational thought. These issues overlap significantly with the debate about nonconceptual content(Byrne 2005;Toribio 2011). We're ignoring these issues here.…”

“…Burge (2010a) offers other arguments for non-propositional content in perception, hinging largely on the fact that perceptual capacities don't require capacities for rational thought. These issues overlap significantly with the debate about nonconceptual content(Byrne 2005;Toribio 2011). We're ignoring these issues here.15 For helpful feedback, we are grateful to Nick Shea, Barry Smith, and other audience members at an Institute of Philosophy lab meeting, and to Chris Peacocke and other members of the Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Discussion Group.…”