Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn, Jake; Green, E. J.

doi:10.1111/phpr.12847

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 115 publications

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“…This account predicts that priming relevant information – including surface features like color or the function of a basic-level artifact category like knife or marker – helps the object file system to make the relevant information accessible to physical reasoning. There is considerable independent evidence from vision science that the object file system makes some encoded properties available for use in object individuation and not others, and that drawing attention to a feature increases the likelihood that it is made available (see Quilty-Dunn & Green, 2023). We agree that further work along the lines Xu describes is needed to show decisively that appropriate priming can allow infants to use abstract basic-level categories for object individuation.…”

Section: Lot and Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science

Quilty-Dunn,

Porot,

Mandelbaum

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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The target article attempted to draw connections between broad swaths of evidence by noticing a common thread: Abstract, symbolic, compositional codes, that is, language-of-thoughts (LoTs). Commentators raised concerns about the evidence and offered fascinating extensions to areas we overlooked. Here we respond and highlight the many specific empirical questions to be answered in the next decade and beyond.

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Section: Lot and Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science

Quilty-Dunn,

Porot,

Mandelbaum

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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“…While methodological views about where to look are rarely made explicit, vehicular rhetoric dominates the literature. For example, Quilty‐Dunn (2017: 61) states that “formats are general types of vehicular structures,” and Beck (2019: 323) writes that he will “understand the thesis that perception is analog solely as a claim about perception's vehicles.” Others have favored alternative approaches: for example, Haugeland (1991) endorses a content approach and Goodman (1968) defends a hybrid vehicle‐content account.…”

Section: Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The structure of analog representation

Lee

Myers

Rabin

2022

Nous

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This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system's interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those marked by the use of interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically.

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“…Furthermore, they propose a 'multiple-slots' view according to which files store different perceptual features in distinct memory stores. 21 For a recent discussion of this issue, see Quilty-Dunn and Green (2021). The authors defend a "flexible model" of attributional reference fixation.…”

Section: Perceptual Mops and Object Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files

Siegel

2022

Erkenn

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Some have defended a Fregean view of perceptual content. On this view, the constituents of perceptual contents are Fregean modes of presentation (MOPs). In this paper, I propose that perceptual MOPs are best understood in terms of object files. Object files are episodic representations that store perceptual information about objects. This information is updated when sensory conditions change. On the proposed view, when a subject perceptually represents some object a under two distinct MOPs, then the subject initiates two object files that both refer to a.My defense of this view appeals to its satisfaction of four constraints that I argue theories of perceptual MOPs should satisfy. Furthermore, I show that some existent accounts of perceptual MOPs fail to satisfy them. The defended constraints also indicate what is unique about perceptual, as opposed to linguistic or cognitive, MOPs.The following discussion gives an account of perceptual MOPs of objects. I ultimately leave it as an open-ended question whether there are MOPs of perceptual attributes and events. 1 Furthermore, on the assumption that there are MOPs of attributes and events in perception, I leave it as open-ended how the proposed account might be applied to them. MOPs of attributes and events raise another set of questions. 2 I do not address these questions in the present paper. In section 1.1, I outline the distinctive epistemic situation that agents are in when they perceive an object under different MOPs. Then, in section 1.2, I distinguish perceptual MOPs from what Crane (2003) calls intentional modes. As I will argue, accounts that conflate intentional modes with MOPs are not feasible. In section 1.3, I argue that perceptual MOPs are not individuated by the representation of distinct properties attributed to their referent. For example, a representation of an object a with the attributed property F does not necessarily constitute a distinct MOP from a representation of a with the attributed property G. In section 1.4, I argue that a theory of perceptual MOPs should elucidate how the content of perceptual experiences enables singular thinking. These four subsections provide a framework for analyzing the plausibility of theories of perceptual MOPs. Furthermore, the framework indicates what is unique about perceptual, as opposed to linguistic or cognitive, MOPs. After providing this framework, in section 2, I give an object files account of perceptual MOPs and I show how the account meets all the specified constraints. Finally, section 3 looks at some existent views on what perceptual MOPs are, i.e., Chalmers (2004) and Schellenberg (2018).In this section, I show that these views fail to meet some of the constraints specified in section 1."MS is a body illuminated by the sun," while rejecting (b) "ES is a body illuminated by the sun."Since it is possible for a rational agent to accept (a), while rejecting (b), given that the only difference is that 'MS' is replaced by 'ES,' these expressions meet Frege's criterion for having different MOPs (1892: 1...

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Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Cited by 12 publications

References 115 publications

The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science

The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science

The structure of analog representation

Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files

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