Competition policy for natural monopolies in a developing market economy1

Ordover, Janusz A.; Pittman, Russell; Clyde, Paul

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.1994.tb00120.x

Cited by 30 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Siegfried (1975) disaggregated the analysis a bit to 65 IRS "minor industries" and concluded that economic variables generally seem to have little influence on Antitrust Division enforcement activity; while an estimate of welfare loss (in some specifications) did have a positive impact on case filing activity, this disappeared when differing sizes of industries (measured by numbers of firms) were controlled for. Market concentration (in some specifications) had the expected positive impact on antitrust cases, but even here the 1 See, for just a few examples, Godek (1992), Pittman (1992aPittman ( , 1992b Ordover et al (1994), and Feinberg and Meurs (1994). 2 By this term we mean both post-Soviet republics and countries more generally thought of as part of Central and Eastern Europe.…”

Section: Previous Literature On Determinants Of Antitrust Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 96%

Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

2011

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While others have examined the implementation and/or the stringency of enforcement of antitrust laws in post-socialist economies, this paper is the first study that attempts to explain the patterns of antitrust enforcement activity across post-socialist countries using economic and political variables. Using a panel of ten European postsocialist countries over periods ranging from 4 to 11 years, we find a number of significant factors associated with enforcement in these countries. For example, our results suggest that countries characterized by more unionization and less corruption tend to engage in greater antitrust enforcement of all types. Countries more successful in privatizing have filed fewer cases, while more affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases of all types, consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust. In general, countries have tended to increase their enforcement efforts over time.

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Section: Previous Literature On Determinants Of Antitrust Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 96%

Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

2011

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“…The latter situation is especially the case in economies like Russia's, where the rule of law is sufficiently tenuous that long-term contracting may be more difficult than usual to rely upon, and parties may be therefore fearful that even a well specified contract may not be enforced (Levy and Spiller 1993;Ordover et al 1994;Laffont 2004;Avdasheva 2005). In that case the welfare-maximizing outcome, ceteris paribus, is more likely than otherwise to be vertical integration: a reliance on within-firm rather than between-firm transactions.…”

Section: An Alternative Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 97%

Make or buy on the Russian railway? Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II

Pittman

2007

Econ Change

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“…The main concerns of the parties will probably be spelled out carefully in the initial bids or contracts, specifying how tariffs are to be set and adjusted, and how cross-subsidies are to be protected against competitive entry ('cherry-picking' or 'cream-skimming'), and how fast investment is to be undertaken. ' Ordover, Pittman and Clyde (1994) argue that considerations of capture and credibility, together with aversion to price controls for historical reasons, suggest that dominant firm price control should in many circumstances be left to the anti-monopoly authorities. Where regulation is needed, they conclude that the seriousness of commitment problems makes incentive regulation inferior to cost-of-service regulation unless international agencies (such as EBRD and the World Bank) can make government commitment credible.…”

Section: Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe

Armstrong¹,

Vickers

1996

Economics of Transition

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In this paper we discuss public policy towards the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), focusing primarily on the need to ensure adequate capital investment. The analysis falls into two main parts: the regulation of monopoly, and policy on liberalization. Concerning regulation, we discuss how policy credibility is likely to be a problem in the region, and how reputational considerations, the design of regulatory institutions, and methods of price control can help to ameliorate this problem. Concerning liberalization, we consider the effects of potential competition on investment incentives, and construct a simple model to analyse the different effects of liberalization and regulatory risk on investment. Some preliminary policy conclusions are drawn, and we argue that in the CEE region - in contrast to more well developed countries - a reasonable case can be made for allowing a temporary period of monopoly for basic services. Copyright 1996 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

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Competition policy for natural monopolies in a developing market economy1

Cited by 30 publications

References 37 publications

Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

Make or buy on the Russian railway? Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II

Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe

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